On the fraught relations between laic and professional analyses in contemporary EMCA

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Abstract

The difference between laic and professional analysis has been identifying of EMCA from its earliest days. This paper attempts to press the difference in the contemporary CA literature by examining studies wherein a professional analysis fails to find or retreats from the laic record, and a 'gap' is produced in the analytic narrative that then becomes a site for the insertion of constructive-analytic dispositions to fill it. The tensions (and continuities) between members' methods and their laic reckonings, and the promise of something prior, formal, and more enduring that can eclipse them are the 'fraught relations' of the title phrase.

INTRODUCTION[1]

EMCA began with the play of Garfinkel's sociologies "lay and professional" and what had been ignored and missed about them both (1967, vii). And leveraged from his relentless curiosity, Harvey Sacks plied his scholarship, cultural membership and extraordinary natural language mastery to anchor his studies of conversation and how they might lead to different understandings of sociology's canonical topics: social action, order, structure, and recurrence. EM and CA share the premise that the analysis of natural language and its play in the production of social order is *itself* leveraged from cultural membership. There is nowhere else to stand. From where we are now, this cannot be news, but it was, and sometimes still may be.

1 These remarks are indebted to conversations dating to the fall of 2013 with Jonas Ivarsson, Oskar Lindwall, Gustav Lymer, Michael Lynch, Wendy Sherman-Heckler, Jean Wong, and more recently Dušan Bjelić and Ken Liberman. In too many places to mention, the discipline of Lynch's conceptual discriminations has instructed us all, and our conversations have yielded multiple publications and panels, singly and jointly authored. For some time, we have been working through Sacks' *Lectures*. A draft of this paper was developed for the 2018 EMCA section panel of the ASA on 'New Directions in Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis Research'.

Developed here through Zimmerman and Pollner (1970), Watson (2008), Turner (2013) and others, the discussion then turns to Sacks' penetrating treatment of the the laic and professional-analytic pair, and then to a collection of three exhibits and perhaps a simpler framing of the relationship as the founding terms of a sociology of cultural membership *by* cultural members. The exhibits address how this plays out when a professional analysis fails to find its materials as those who are engaged in assembling them may have found them, how the lacunae that follow produce 'gaps' in our understandings of what the parties are doing, and how those gaps invite a turn to the methods of formal or constructive-analysis to repair the distance. This is the 'sequence' I hope to show across the exhibits.

But I want to begin with some remark on a growing sense of loss in our community, the loss of Harold Garfinkel, Chuck Goodwin, Stephen Hestor, Gail Jefferson, Michael Moerman, Mel Pollner, George Psathas, David Sudnow, Roy Turner, Larry Wieder, Robert Emerson, Mark Peyrot and others, Sacks before them all, and Schegloff's prolonged absence and now his passing (May 23, 2024). We have been blessed with teachers.

Roy Turner passed in the spring of 2017. He was the Banquet speaker for the IIEMCA meetings of 2013 in Waterloo, Canada, and delivered a memorable oral history and conceptual treatment of an extraordinary cohort of doctoral students and faculty at Berkeley in the early 60s. Turner anchored his remarks with the opening lines of Garfinkel's *Studies*, about how: "In doing sociology, lay and professional, every reference to the "real world," even where the reference is to physical or biological events, is a reference to the organized activities of everyday life" (Garfinkel 1967, vii).[2] He continued:

> The profession of course lived off of making a sharp distinction between professional and lay sociology—the latter, the domain of commonsense, stood in need of correction, and ethnomethodology's critics had no intention of opening up an alternative view... Even worse, [EM] proposed to treat the very substance of professional sociology as *itself* a phenomenon, theoretical structures demoted to a "reference to the organized activities of everyday life." (2013, 7) [3]

I want to pursue the pair—the professional-analytic and the laic-analytic—in a slightly different fashion, on the chance that their intersections may be a useful way to engage the ongoing question of the conceptual relations of EM and CA, on the one hand, and the contemporary literature in CA that seems to be developing in Schegloff's absence, on the other.

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2 Turner pairs the citation to Descombes' kindred remarks: "It is reprehensible," said Descombes of professional social science, "that [they] should pretend to judge events as if they were seated in an auditorium rather than onstage like everybody else." (1993, 40) Descombes anticipates the critique of the 'epistemic analytic framework' (Drew 2018a) by Lynch and his colleagues (Lynch and Macbeth 2016).

3 The topic of how Garfinkel's pair has played in the conceptual foundations for EM/CA has been taken up in many places over the years, as in Psathas (1979) in Schegloff's (1992) Introductions to Sacks' lectures and his (2003/2017) interview with Cmejrkova and Prevignano, his (2000) interview with Wong and Oshler, and in discussions of how CA's and EM's foundations might each be found in the other (cf. Livingston and Lynch 2017; Lynch 1993, 2000).

The formulation of 'Schegloff's absence' of course begs the question of his *presence*, and in Macbeth (2020) I took up Schegloff's presence in these last 50 years or so through the passage by Bolinger cited in the first footnote of the repair paper: "Correction, the border beyond which we say 'no' to an expression, is to language what a seacoast is to a map... Its motive is intelligibility..." (Bolinger [1953] 1965, 248; Schegloff, Sacks, and Jefferson 1977). Many novel maps have been written—and are being written—of our natural language seacoasts, across disciplines and literatures, from within and without CA. They intend to innovate our navigations, and innovation is always a professional prize, as it was for EM and CA, though perhaps not so easily won then. For his part, however, as Schegloff monitored CA's seacoasts throughout his professional career, he said 'No' more than once to alternate and more conventional map-makings.[4]

Those articulations have come to an end. And that they have context what I mean for 'the contemporary literature of CA'. The formulation is both delicate and central for the paper and has to do with how our collective maps have opened to new proposals in Schegloff's absence.

THE LAIC AND THE PROFESSIONAL-ANALYTIC

The familiar relationship of the laic and professional-analytic that Turner discussed through Garfinkel is longstanding in EMCA and longer standing in modern social science. Zimmerman and Pollner (1970) in their now classic "The everyday world as phenomenon" observed how the path of modern social science has been tied to a competition with common sense, and how in this view, the 'loose', ill-discipline of practical reasoning was certain to be eclipsed by professional sociological reasoning. By this account, modern social science was leveraged on the certainty of the outcome, and Garfinkel, Sacks, their colleagues and students have been excavating the conceptual knots of natural language use that continue to defeat the promise. And through their studies, the relationship of the pair—the laic and the professional—was shown to be a good deal more than oppositional.

Watson's (2008) discussion of professional and laic analyses is especially helpful in understanding the 'what more' of it. He, and he is not alone, underscores not only the competition but the deep continuities between the laic-analytic and the professional-analytic through our reliance in every case on grammars of natural language use. See, for examples, Garfinkel's remarks on the work of jurors and coders (1967), his studies of work (1986), EM's science studies, e.g., Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston (1981) and Lynch (1985, 1993, *passim*), legal studies (Burns 2001; Lynch 2007; Pollner 1979) and many more contemporary studies of the intersections of the laic and professional-analytic (e.g., Bjelic 2023; Mair and Sharrock 2021; Sormani and Wolter 2023; Watson and Carlin 2012). Interest in the intersections will be found throughout the EMCA study corpus (see Button 1991).

Watson examines them in the particulars of managing equivalence class relations—a central task for professional sociological reasoning—and how ordinary language use is "redolent with 'commonsense equivalence classes'" (2008, 5). He offers Sacks' development of 'mem-

4 See, for examples, Schegloff (1988, 1991, 1992, 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2005, 2007b, 2009, and below, 2010a).

bership categories' and their 'relational pairs' as exemplary of how "laic equivalence classes are both primordial to and formative of the professional ones..." (5)[5]

In an interview, Schegloff offers a kindred view of how our professional-analytic foundations are firmly rooted in laic competencies. In his remarks to Cmejrkova and Prevignano, first published in 2003, and then reproduced in his 2017 festschrift, the interviewers have asked whether other cultures of conversation might eclipse the systematics developed in 1974. Schegloff allows the possibility as one to be demonstrated. And his vision for future work includes the following:

> My own belief is that the best way to have this work done in other languages is to have native speakers of those other languages and native members of those cultures learn how to do the analysis and then go to work on materials in the culture and in the language that they have a native control over... (2017, 17–18; see also Wong and Olsher 2000).

This is a remarkably straightforward proposal (notwithstanding the premise of 'control' rather than, say, competent cultural membership without which we would struggle to see, in its laic constitutive detail, *what* the parties are saying and doing). The revealing analysis of the orderliness of natural conversation is for analysts to examine from within their competence to the conversational grammars they study and describe, as Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, among others, have ably demonstrated. It also re-writes the membership category of the professional analyst: not only duly licensed by training and education, analysts also need be competent to the sensible expressions and actions they would analyze.

As Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) propose, the mastery of natural language is the mark of cultural membership, and among other things, through membership we develop the thoroughly laic pair of 'speaking and listening'. This paper focuses on 'listening', as this is what professional analyses do: how we hear the talk of others and thus hear and see what others are doing as matters of sequential production, social action, and the laic analyses that their hearings—our hearings—evidence. As an impression, when taken aback by Sacks' lectures, often we are for what he hears. It is, of course, not only through his laic membership; there is his relentless

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5 Set to the aims and ambitions of professional analysis, laic equivalence classing grounds formal equivalences. It is a transformation substantially achieved by reification, whereby the occasioned laic expression is rendered "a bounded object... [cut off] from its immediate context" (Watson 2008, 5). In the contemporary CA literature the 'cutting off' is commonly found in treatments of just a few lines of transcript, ignoring both the depth of sequential environments and the parties' histories with them. Watson then explores whether and how CA, in assembling its collections, is "in some of its areas and in some significant respects, increasingly involving itself in just such reifying operations." He also notes how, whether laic or professional, equivalence operations are irreducibly contingent achievements (6). They rely upon the situated contextures that formal operations promise to eclipse. As Sacks remarked:

> It's a credo of social science reasoning that we can suffer the loss of details while we build abstract models. It's a feature of abstract models, as compared to the real reality, that they do not preserve the details. Possibly it needn't be. (1992 v. 2, part vii, lecture 2, 430)

curiosity and scholarship whereby he leads us time and again to laic grammars of ordinary conversation we have not noticed or imagined. In good measure, they constitute his *Lectures*.[6]

AN EXEMPLAR

> For members, activities are observable. They see activities. They see persons doing intimacy; they see persons lying, etc. And that poses for us the task of being behaviorists in this sense: Finding how it is that people can do sets of actions that provide that others can see such things. (Sacks 1992, v. 1, 119)[7]

That EMCA analyses take interest in their materials so as to describe how the parties assemble them, see into, speak of, hear, understand and act from them, is a useful way of speaking of the extraordinary conceptual innovations that EMCA have leveraged since mid-century. Those 'sets of actions' for doing this or that become roughly the 'machinery' and 'grammars' of social action that Sacks speaks of as he directly addresses the relevance of 'ordinary member descriptions' and how professional analysis may have use for them (1984; 1992).

A portion of the title crafted by Jefferson for his lecture seven in volume 2, Spring 1970, Part IV is '*What's going on in a lay sense*...' The discussion begins with a complex transcript of a phone call between two sisters, Portia and Agnes (we see them by different names in Sacks' collected materials, and elsewhere (e.g., Heritage 2011, 160; Heritage and Raymond 2005, 17). The transcript is attached as Appendix A, and in an extended discussion, Sacks gives us some context and particulars of their exchange. Here is part of his presentation:

> Let me give a little background on the data. Agnes and Portia are sisters, middle-aged ladies. Portia is more or less long-time separated from her husband, and she went away for a couple of days to visit Kate, a friend of hers. Kate is kind of recently remarried to Carl, a very rich man. Portia has just come back, and she and Agnes are talking on the phone about, among other things, the trip. Now, the facts I give to context the fragment, I obviously picked as relevant to what's going on, and I suppose were something else going on, I might have offered some others. So, which facts, that I have from other conversations or from other parts of this conversation, tum out to be relevant, turn in part on getting some idea about what's going on. (269)

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6 In mid-century, the embrace of cultural membership was a badge of disloyalty to the disciplines and their attachments to alienation as the path to, of all things, understanding. (See, for example, Vidich 1955) EMCA has heard it from its outset and more recently, as in Levinson's critiques of CA's 'soft underbelly' (2013, 105) and 'Manny's dangerous idea' that 'social order is the local product of interaction' (2005, 432). Levinson correctly cites the idea; see Schegloff's reply (2005, 455–80).

7 Schegloff speaks of these inquiries as a kind of non-technical phenomenology (1992 v. 2, xlvi). Anderson and Sharrock (2019) speak of it as 'third person phenomenology'. They remind us that laic and EMCA accounts are not identical, nor are laic productions identical to laic accounts, though accounts are constitutive of productions. Each—the production and its account-ability—is topical for EMCA. You will find them throughout Sacks' Lectures (1992) and in the discussion by Sacks that follows.

He then presents the transcript (see Appendix A) and continues:

> Put kind of straightforwardly, what I figure is going on is that as Portia sees it, an event took place on this evening which she, at that time, saw as being possibly dangerous for Kate's relationship to Carl. And at that time she took steps, both to check out whether indeed a dangerous thing had happened and whether she might do something to help Kate's position in the situation. That is, she thought then and there that Kate might have done something that embarrassed, maybe angered, annoyed, Carl. She then proceeded to tell Carl how good a person Kate was, in some aid of Kate.
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> Now that's an altogether informal, unproved, perhaps unprovable, perhaps irrelevant to prove it, characterization of what took place. And it's just the sort of observing that, when it appears in a student's paper, we thoroughly discourage. However, it is one legitimate and fruitful way to approach materials, for the initial observations themselves, and in that that sort of sophisticated lay observation of a scene is one way that you come to find items that can be extracted and developed quite independently of the observations one initially made, where the initial observations need not, then, be presented. One needs to see if those sorts of observations, that sort of a discussion, can lead to something that could perhaps transcend it and turn into some sort of serious statement, other than the statement I offered, which perhaps Portia herself could offer (271; see also Sacks 1984).

By degrees, his discussion turns from the background of what was going on as reported by Portia to Agnes to the report itself.[8] Stories are a recurrent topic in the *Lectures*, and in these particulars he points out how Portia tells Agnes what she said to Carl in Kate's absence [they are complimentary of Kate], as were her remarks to Kate in Carl's absence.

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Portia:  Oh:: God, en I told im, eh so when she wen't' the restroom
         I sez "Boy there goes a great gal" 'n 'e s'z "Boy I sure l:love
         'er 'n I hope I c' n make 'er happy'' so, when, 'hh we came
         home why he wen'tuh bed 'nen we went swimming again
         'fore w'w(hh)en'tuh//bed-'hh
Agnes:   Oh: : God, isn'at fu::/n?
Portia:  Ahheh! Yeh. So, 'hh I told Kate 'e said 'at 'e sez y- "Oh yer
         a liar" I s'z "Well no:: at's he said the: : : they- he said that
         to me" he s'z "Well 'e never tells' me" en I sez "e said that-
         tuh//me"
Agnes:   Mm hm, (Sacks 1992 v.2, 270)
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8 In the move from the vernacular account of the scene, 'which perhaps Portia herself could offer', to how the account reported to Agnes takes shape, Sacks turns to one of the interests that held him through the Lectures: the grammars of story or account construction and account-able worlds. (See Garfinkel 1967 and Turner 2013, for the hyphenated phrase.)

Sacks continues:

> So, for example, a kind of thing that one could notice in stories is that at least some of the time a teller will keep track of the co-participants to the conversation at various points in it. It is done several times in this story, i.e., when Portia reports "and I *told* him, eh so when she went to the restroom I says..." she provides for the absence of Kate. Then, when she reports that she told Kate about what Carl told her, she provides for the absence of Carl: "when we came home, why he went to bed and then we went swimming again... so I *told* Kate..." What she told Carl, then, she told him in the absence of Kate, and vice versa. Moreover, she tells Agnes that she told each one in the absence of the other. And in that regard, we can note a kind of routine thing: When she reports to Kate in Carl's absence what Carl said, she doesn't tell Kate what *she* had said that got Carl to say what he said. She says "I told Kate he said . . . " and not "I told Kate that when I said X, he said Y." So, Portia having done a compliment about Kate, Carl returns a compliment about Kate, but when she reports to Kate, she can report just what Carl said and not what she said that got him to say it—or for that matter, why she said what she said that got him to say what he said. (271)

These remarks are on topic of the grammars of compliments produced not simply by one party to another, as we know them in the received literature, but compliments solicited by third persons that become *reported* compliments embedded in stories and accounts of how the compliment was done.

Further,

> We're lucky for other things that the story has, that we don't have in a transcript of the story's events. These turn on the ways in which stories may be designed for their listener [here, Agnes], now not simply in the sense of what their listener knows and doesn't know in general, but what their listener might or might not have in mind at the moment, over the course of the story. One of the things that Portia is doing throughout the story is, in various ways, dealing with relevancies that she knows of that turn out to be important for the last thing or the next thing said. It's not just that sometimes a fact might be asserted which the other party doesn't know, but that whether the other party knows it or not, the issue is would they *use* it now. So what we have is a sense of context being employed by the teller, which involves fitting to the story, in carefully located places, information that will permit the appreciation of what was transpiring, information which involves events that are not in the story sequence at that point. (274)

The discussion so far devotes a good deal of space to Sacks' first work. In part it is to offer grounds for Schegloff's remark that "We'll never know what discipline it [would have] turned into had he still been alive." (2003/2017, 27) In part it is to suggest the depth of laic analyses that he brings to our attention. He was a deeply astute cultural member, and his member's hearings of *other* members' hearings and accounts underwrite his professional analyses. Whatever the imagined distance between the professional and the laic, they are joined at the hip in his work, and the purpose of these remarks is to frame the exhibits that follow, for how their interests bend toward separation.

With this background, I want to sketch a path through some contemporary work in CA that may show the relationship between professional and laic analysis in a light both familiar, and different. Conventionally, members and analysts are oriented to the same witnessa-

ble fields as they take different interests in and speak differently of them. But if membership underwrites both laic and professional analyses in their different fashions, my materials are asking how this relationship of membership to professional analysis plays out in any actual case, and specifically how it plays out when a professional analysis fails to find its materials as cultural members may find them, or otherwise mis-sights or takes no interest in how they do.

With some delicacy, what happens when sequential analysis fails these tasks is my topic, for how the analysis may then produce a 'gap' in its production account that invites very different questions and resources, questions aligned with professional dispositions about what sensible facts and explanations could be.[9] When sequential studies veer towards ignoring or mis-sighting the laic production of their materials, they can produce accounts that have need for the intervention of more normative, professional-analytic formulations that can fill and smooth the gaps with findings. And these things when laic hearings fall from view.

WHAT WE KNOW OF DIAMOND RINGS...

The first exhibit is a hugely co-authored piece by Mikesell et al. (2017) that offers a study of the expression "I know" in talk-in-interaction in second position,

> as a responding action, showing that it claims to accept the grounds of the initiating action but either resists that action as un-necessary or endorses it, depending on the epistemic environment created by the initiating action. (2017, 268; abstract)

The alternation between resistance and endorsement turns on the 'epistemic environment' of those first turns; there are those that 'presume an unknowing addressee... [and] those that presume a knowing addressee'. The difference organizes a collection of several exhibits, and my discussion focuses on one of them for how it ties back to how deeply Sacks relies upon his laic cultural membership to examine the same. It also ties to how formal or professional–analytic dispositions of the kinds Schegloff discusses in his commentary on Stivers and Rossano (2010) [see below] can find a place within a sequential-analytic program that is so clearly tied to the analysis and description of laic grammars of action, tasks for which cultural membership is indispensable, until it is not.

What is of special interest in this exhibit is how the unremarkable cultural membership of the analysts is first relied upon, and then, at a critical juncture, suppressed in a kind of self-handicapping of understanding. In the suppression, evident cultural things and expressions become opaque, and in that puzzle space—in the putative not knowing of how certain

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9 Sacks speaks of the tendency to select the 'facts' for our inquiries from those for which we have explanations:

> When we think about facts, insofar as we are thinking of scientific facts, we tend to pose problems in the following way: If it's the case that something has occurred, then our problem is to explain it... The reverse procedure consists of the following: In deciding among possible competing facts, one may decide that that fact occurred which has an explanation, and that fact that hasn't an explanation did not occur. (1992 v. 1, 121)... At least in this society, facts and explanations have more than a one-way relation to each other. (124)

laic expressions work—a formal program finds its task and authorization to produce an account relieved of the knowing ways of speaking and hearing that produced it. The turn to formal analysis finds a gap to be filled, where the gap's production comes first.

The exhibit is a phone call received by a married daughter from her mother. In line 6 Kathy, the daughter, produces a pre–announcement: "guess what I got <for my> anniversary:." Produced in Kathy's third turn, the analysis is taken up with the parties' 'evaluative stances' towards the gift that is announced in her next turn, and, centrally, how neither party ever says in so many words what her 'stance' towards the gift is. This 'never saying' yields 'allusions', and therefore puzzles of inference for the parties to resolve, and for the analysts to account for how they do so.

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Extract 8: IK1 Happy Anniversary (University of Texas Conversation Library)
01  KAT:  Hello:
02  MOM:  Hell↑o::↓
03  KAT:  [(Well) how are you do]ing.
04  MOM:  [(                   )]
05  MOM:  Oh I'm doin' f↑i:↓:ne.
06  KAT:  We:ll- guess what I got <for my> anniversary:.
07  MOM:  Wha::t.
08  KAT:  A diamond ri::ng.
09  MOM:  My gra↑::↓ciou[:s.  ]
10  KAT:                [I: kn] ↑o↓:[w.]
11  MOM:                            [Ha]ppy anniversary.
12  KAT:  Ye-=w'll thank yo:u.=
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The sequence is said to demonstrate "the robust character of *I know* [line 10] as a claim of independently arrived at agreement with alluded-to evaluative stances" (278). Those stances are found in Kathy's pre-announcement of line 6, her announcement in line 8, and especially in her mother's assessment of line 9. They also frame Kathy's 'independent agreement'—her "[I: kn] ↑o↓:[w.]"—in line 10, and from the outset the treatment regards these turns as 'allusions', or "alluded-to evaluative stances". For example, of Kathy's line 6, it is the "vocal production and the early placement of this pre-announcement" that suggests that the gift—not yet announced—is "out–of–the–ordinary". On the other hand, the call for a 'guess' does much the same, and rather than offer a 'guess', Mom hears the turn as a 'call for the question', and she calls it in line 7.

And once said in line 8—"a diamond ri::ng."—it is observed that:[10]

10 The treatment suggests that the placement of line 6 "preempts a first topic nomination by Mom" (278). Presumably the characterization follows from how Mom, as caller, doesn't yet have an opportunity to produce 'her reason for the call'. But one could say as well that Kathy may be responding to Mom's 'how are you', if that's what we have in lines 3–4, i.e., simultaneous 'how are yous'. If so, Mom answers first in 5, and Kathy begins her reply with 'We:ll-' in 6, cuts it off and continues with her pre-announcement, which is indeed on topic of 'how she is'. She has news to tell.

> Kathy does not articulate her evaluative stance toward the gift (i.e., she does not verbally express whether it is a good or bad thing) but rather, through her intonation, indicates that the surprise is a good one, leaving Mom with inferential work to do. (278–79)

Similarly, Mom's "My gra↑ ::↓ ciou:s." in line 9 "treats the gift as out-of-the-ordinary—in large part through aspects of its vocal production." (279) "[T]he assessment term indicates surprise but does not indicate whether the surprise is positive or negative." (278) Thus,

> in the same way that Kathy does not explicitly articulate her evaluative stance in announcing the gift, Mom does not explicitly convey a position on the gift or the act of gift giving in her assessment of it. Kathy responds to this assessment with " I: kn↑ o↓ :w." at line 10. (279)

What then follows are several observations about Kathy's "I know" response having to do with its terminal overlap of her Mom's prior, and also how it prosodically matches Mom's prior turn "in terms of both pitch and sound stretch". For the analysis, these are the production features that lead us [and, claimedly the parties, first] to hear Kathy's '*I know*' as agreeing with Mom's assessment as an 'independent endorsement'.

This last phrase has epistemic attachments (as in an 'epistemically' independent endorsement), though the substantial literature of epistemic CA is not much in evidence in the discussion of the sequence. The study's 'Background' discussion, however, gives pride of place to the 'epistemic considerations [that] pervade the construction of talk-in-interaction' and are a 'crucial ingredient in recipient design', and goes on to explain the 'status' and 'stance' distinctions (269). But the central puzzle to be worked out in this sequence seems to be how,

> neither the announcement nor its uptake articulated the speakers' evaluation of the gift, and [how] *I know* leaves the evaluation unexplicated. In other words, *I know* claims an independent endorsement of the alluded-to assessment. (279)

Independent or not, it is the putative inarticulateness of both Kathy's pre-announcement, her announcement—'a diamond ri::ng'—and the uptake by Mom—'My gra↑::↓ciou[:s.]'—that renders them 'allusions' to un-explicated stances (but see Schegloff 1996 on 'confirming allusions').[11] And, driving the point home, "by responding with *I know*, the speaker can claim to be fully endorsing an alluded-to position *for unstated reasons*." (279; emphasis added)

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11 Schegloff uses 'allusion' broadly:

> I use the term 'allusion' here very broadly, including diverse usages from 'hinting' to such 'nonliteral' tropes as metaphor, metonomy and analogy... Although semiotically speaking it may well be that anything can mean anything, it is striking that in ordinary uses of the vernacular, participants do not behave that way... They wrest the ordinary from the indefinitely many possibilities and from the possibilities of indefiniteness. (1996, 181–82)

Mikesell et al. seem to be wresting indefiniteness from the ordinary, so as to have it repaired by a formal-analytic intervention.

Thus, there is something allusory about Kathy's agreement too, and it seems that every turn of lines 6–10 is limned with allusions to 'unstated reasons'. The analytic puzzle in all of this—the allusions and the inferential work they implicate, the absence of articulate 'stances' and how they yield Kathy's 'independent endorsement'—seems to issue from this absence of 'stated reasons'. It may then be useful to ask: how much of the coherence of talk–in–interaction and its massive achievements of common understanding is leveraged from 'stated reasons'? The proposal expresses a kind of logo-centricity, as though the understandings achieved in natural conversation followed from articulate premises. But what play could 'stated reasons' have in grammars of indexical expressions?[12]

'Stated reasons' are a wholly un-expected formulation of how conversation or common understanding works or could work. But their absence is the claim on which the authors leverage the relevance of prosody and epistemic independence for the sense of the exchange. The absent reasons constitute a 'gap', and it is filled in this fashion: while the absence of 'stated reasons' in Kathy's announcement leaves Mom with "inferential work to do" [just as her reply leaves Kathy and the analysts with their own], it is the prosodic and epistemic elements of their turn productions that bring sense to their exchange and secures the progressivity of the sequence. These elements become the engines of common understanding, and were it so, they would be significant findings, revealing how natural conversation contends with what would otherwise be an unrelieved fabric of 'allusion'.

But there is no evidence in these materials that anyone seeks clarification or initiates repair. And the allusions generated by un-stated reasons seem dissolved by the very expressions that are said to evidence them. We seem to have here the kinds of laic analyses evidenced in first and next turn assessments, where 'my gracious' would be a first, and 'I know' a second produced in overlapping agreement. Such a sequential account would relieve us of the puzzle of 'independent endorsements'. Kathy's second assessment and how it's said would seem to catch the sense of 'independence' and agreement more clearly. We needn't look elsewhere for it. But if, on the other hand, discerning prosodic surfaces and more deeply layered epistemic backgrounds were sufficient to recover the order and understanding of their exchange *for them*, we would

12 'Stated reasons' can be tough to find in ordinary conversation. For example,

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CABank/Jefferson/NB/21swimnude.cha
74 Lot: [h h]Jeeziz Chrise shu sh'd see that house
75      E(h)mma yih'av ↓no idea.h[hmhh
76 Emm:                          [I bet it's a drea:m.
77      <Wih the swimming POO:L ENCLO:SED[HU:H↗
78 Lot:                                  [ü-
79 Lot: Oh::::::: Kho:d we ·hhihhh uh hü ↑We swam in the n:ude ·hh Sundee
80      night u(h)ntil aba[ht  two  uh' clo:ck+.]
81 Emm:                   [ehh h e h h e h huh h] a:h
```

Do we find here 'reasons' shaping their understanding of this exchange? Do we speak by 'giving reasons'? Lynch (1985, 271, endnote 21) cites Sacks on the 'preference for agreement', and how "People do not explore the sources of their agreement as they do the sources of their disagreement" (Sacks 1976, Agreement Notebook III, School of Social Sciences, UC Irvine, held at the department of Sociology, UCLA).

have no need to know what any cultural member knows of anniversaries and their gifts—as in the difference, as gifts go, between a diamond ring and, say, a pound of carrots—in order to see how the parties get on with the gift in question. We would instead consult the formal features the authors propose—some audible, some temporal, some of epistemic status—in order to take the measure of the gift and the understandings that attach to it. Fairly, if it were so, this would be an analytic achievement. Knowing little else of this *form of life* we would now have a commanding view onto how allusions are managed, understandings-without-stated-reasons achieved, and what they are.

My point is to observe how the professional puzzles and solutions we find here make their way into the analytic narrative by ignoring what anyone would know about marriage, anniversaries, diamond rings, who gives and receives them, and how mothers and married daughters report their lives to each other.[13] In the shadow of things we know perfectly well as cultural members but set aside as though we don't know them, we find the puzzles of 'allusions', 'stances', 'reasons' and the appointment of professional analysis to solve them. Note further how alongside what the authors treat as puzzles to be solved, they freely access their laic familiarities elsewhere in the exchange, about telephone greetings, 'how are yous', 'who has called whom', questions and replies, and what announcements call for next, before proceeding as though they—*and the parties*—are puzzling over *this* announcement.[14] The alternation stands at some distance from Garfinkel's and Sacks' orientations to natural language as a praxiology of competent cultural membership that is, at once, indispensable to the study of the same.

MOBILIZING A RESPONSE

In a special issue of *Discourse Studies*, Stivers and Rossano (2010) produced an analysis that, in its way, re-wrote an organizational problematic long known, developed and distinctive to sequential analysis. Variously developed as turn taking, sequence progressivity, the achievements of common understanding and why we listen to one another (Heritage 2007; Moerman and Sacks 1988; Sacks 1992; Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974; Schegloff 2007a), these interests and descriptions were of organizational things that were largely ignored in the received literatures of sociology and language study. They were kindred to Garfinkel's 'gaps in the

13 No doubt there is cultural change underfoot in those relations, but 'what anyone would know' about these occasions and their giftings is still quite serviceable. Note further that Kathy is married, it is her anniversary, and she is now receiving a diamond ring from her husband.

14 What EMCA know of telephone openings and turn taking is certainly indebted to a literature. But not for the *in vivo* recognizabilities the literature has brought to our attention. The recognizability of the CA's first findings own deep laic foundations. See Levinson (1983, 296) on the unremarkably ordinary things sequential analysis was bringing into view: things quite recognizable, but otherwise not worthy of mention, were now seen as assembling a complex sequential architecture.

literature' (Garfinkel 2002, 131), wherein descriptions of the local productions of action and order on actual occasions went missing.[15]

The gaps at hand in Stivers and Rossano are both similar and different. They too sight a gap that makes for a conceptual innovation within CA itself. They have written a considered analysis of how first turns routinely, though not always, 'mobilize responses' and thus yield next turns. Their abstract provides a clear account of the paper's project:

> A fundamental puzzle in the organization of social interaction concerns how one individual elicits a response from another. This article asks what it is about some sequentially initial turns that reliably mobilizes a coparticipant to respond and under what circumstances individuals are accountable for producing a response... [W]ith particular response-mobilizing features of turn-design speakers can hold recipientsmore accountable for responding or not. This model of response relevance allows sequential position, action, and turn design to each contribute to response relevance. (2010, 3)

On the one hand, 'mobilized' next turns can seem evident in every next turn production, whether as replies to greetings, questions or complaints. Sequential implicativeness is foundational to CA's understanding of next turn productions, and those productions are now a "fundamental puzzle" for the paper. I want to ask how we come to them this time.

We do so through a collection of transcripts. Across them we see various first turns, roughly questions and assessments, that receive a continuum of forthright replies to attenuated, delayed replies, to no reply at all. Thus, the collection delivers a puzzle: can we account for variable up-takes in next turn as evidence of various response mobilizations in first turn, keeping in mind that collections are themselves professional constructions?

Their first transcript is suggestive for understanding 'how one individual elicits a response from another.' A parenthetic note tells us that 'Lance and Gio have been in conversation and that Jude [Judy] is not visibly attending.' On p. 4, immediately following the transcript, they ask: "What properties of sequentially initial turns reliably mobilize a coparticipant to respond? Relatedly, do these properties render individuals accountable for producing a response?"

```
1. LAN:    This is gonna be good.
2.         These smell good.
3.      -> (0.8)
4. GIO:    D'ya remember which ones are Jude's?,
5. LAN: -> Y[eah (   )
6. LAN:     [((points to burger))
```

The treatment of the transcript, and those that follow, is on-topic of significant but easily missed innovations in the conceptual reckonings of sequential analysis, innovations that Scheg-

15 In his 2002 discussion, Garfinkel was looking for descriptions of the first and second segments of Lebenswelt Pairs as developed by Livingston (1986) in his studies of mathematical praxis. But Garfinkel's gaps encompass more than the missing Pair. The 'missing what' was a familiar phrase in his lectures.

loff takes up in close detail in his accompanying 'Commentary'. We begin to see them in the text that immediately follows the transcript, and how it aims to show how LAN's assessments in line 1 and 2 might be expected to find the uptake of a second assessment in next turn, or soon thereafter. But they don't. Instead we find the duration of line 3, and then a turn by GIO in line 4 that is non-responsive to the prior turns, and poses instead a first–turn question to LAN about Jude that LAN directly answers with a 'Yeah' and a point [lines 5 and 6]. One can fairly observe that LAN's first turns receive no uptake, and GIO's does.

In the text that follows, Stivers and Rossano set up a contrasting set of conceptualizations for treating next-turn productions: there is on the one hand the linguistic view that 'privileges lexico-morphosyntactic features... Thus it is linguistic form that matters for whether an utterance is taken up.' (4)

> In contrast with this perspective, within sociology Schegloff and Sacks argue that responses are mobilized through the functional properties of actions. They express this through the property of conditional relevance (Schegloff 1968; Schegloff and Sacks 1973). Depending on what sort of sequence-initial action an individual performs, a response of a particular type is relevant next... In this view, turn design is usually considered to be consequential for the type of response provided... What has not been considered is the possibility that turn design may in fact condition whether or not response is mobilized at all. (4)

By this account, whereas linguistics treats 'linguistic form' as determinative of 'whether an utterance is taken up', sequential analysis takes a functional route of 'turn-type relevance'. Their discussion relies on vernacular turn types such as 'greetings, requests, invitations, and offers' (4; see Schegloff's discussion below of how familiar turn type categories—questions, promises and the rest—are vernacular, not formal, objects). In this fashion, a 'functional account' of sequential organization is offered to pose the question of whether 'turn design may in fact condition whether or not a response is mobilized at all.' The 'at all' is the prize, and turn design is the proposed engine. It would be an opening onto an alternative conceptualization of the organization of turn taking leveraged from the particulars of their collection and from a particular conceptualization of the work of turn taking. The 'at all' inserts 'response mobilization' as a move or operation of first turns that 'turn types' cannot fully account for. That much is agreed.

Stivers and Rossano thus cite a gap in the CA literature having to do with 'what has not been considered' about response mobilization. On the other hand, we can expect they would agree that CA provides a robust account of a very great many next turns, not all, of course, but of the great observable regularities of next turns, each displaying its production history in situ. But it is not the production of next turns as we routinely find them that holds Stivers and Rossano interest. Rather, it is when next turns are delayed, attenuated, or, as seen above, not forthcoming at all. It is occasions such as these that their collection collects, to examine the play of first-turn design in these outcomes.

'TURN DESIGN'

There is of course far more at play than vernacular-functional turn types in the sequential organizations of conversation. Turn initiations and completions are only *possible* turns and completions, and the contingency is lost if we rely on vernacular types for our accounts.[16] Yet the leading edge of the innovation here is the notion that sequential analysis offers a *functional* treatment wherein first turns call for seconds that functionally align to them. And often enough they do—questions receive answers, or at least replies—but every next turn is achieved in its course, rather than type-fitted. Stivers and Rossano go on to propose a different and allied account of how next turns are produced, having to do with how next turn speakers are held *accountable* in the first turn for producing them:

> We suggest that speakers mobilize response through the combination of multiple resources employed simultaneously: through the social action a speaker produces, the sequential position in which it is delivered, and through turn-design features that increase the recipient's accountability for responding—interrogative lexico-morphosyntax, interrogative prosody, recipient-focused epistemicity [sic], and speaker gaze. In contrast with a view of response relevance as binary and discrete—either conditional or not (Schegloff 1968; Schegloff and Sacks 1973)—we suggest that response relevance is best conceptualized as on a cline such that speakers can rely on turn-design resources to increase the response relevance of a turn beyond the relevance inherent in the action performed. In what follows we address these issues systematically, providing support for a revised model of how speakers mobilize response in conversation. (2010, 4)

Again, the ambition is substantial, and yet their offer seems no less functionalist in the account of a 'cline' (or continuum) of variable 'response relevant' productions, while relying on a surprising understanding of Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974) as proposing a systematics that is 'binary and discrete'. Though familiar enough in the epistemic analytic framework [EAF] (Raymond 2018), where 'K+/K–' is indeed 'binary and discrete', this characterization of CA is at least as remarkable as the account of 'response mobilization' it underwrites. It is difficult to imagine such a reading of Sacks' (1992) or Schegloff's corpus, and Schegloff says as much in his commentary.

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16 In volume two of the *Lectures* Sacks takes up turns and utterances (along with topics and identities) as 'possibles':

> So we're talking now about 'possible sentences' and 'possible utterances', and furthermore we're not just talking about that as a kind of statistical caveat (i.e., we could talk about actuals but we're not going to venture that far); what we're saying is that for producers and for hearers, an actual sentence is 'one possibility,' or some actualization of possibilities. And they have as a capacity that they can actualize other possibilities. (1992 v. 2, 80)

SCHEGLOFF'S COMMENTARY

Schegloff's (2010a) commentary on Stivers and Rossano's treatment is deeply critical along three lines:

a) First, he argues that Stivers and Rossano have written an "actor–centric" model of interaction (Schegloff 2010a, 39). We can hear it in the abstract in the play of 'accountability', and how 'with particular response-mobilizing features of turn-design speakers can hold recipients more accountable for responding or not.'

They continue: 'With particular actions, Schegloff asserts, social actors impose on co–interactants the normative obligation to perform a particular type-fitted response at the first possible opportunity.' (5) But the language of 'imposition', 'obligation' and 'type-fitting' is as difficult to recover from CA as a grammar and syntax of conversation (see Sacks 1984 and Schegloff 1979) as it is from the Schegloff passage they cite.[17] Note also how the 'accountability' here is the familiar one of holding others 'to account' [a common social action]. This is at some distance from Garfinkel's and Sacks' interests in the production of 'account-able' worlds and 'the essential reflexivity of accounts' whereby accounts are 'constitutive features of the settings they make observable' (Garfinkel 1967, 8; Garfinkel and Sacks 1970).

These characterizations are "actor-centric", and Schegloff points to its familiarity as action's 'locus of order' through Goffman's critique of it: 'In many ways [their account] echoes in reverse the distinction Erving Goffman (1967) drew at the end of his preface to his volume, Interaction Ritual: "Not, then, men and their moments; rather, moments and their men."' He continues: 'It is the elements of conduct and the occasions they organize, not their deployers, that occupy the central role in CA's ways of understanding talk and other conduct-in-interaction.' (40)

The difference is telling. At the same time, we can note a certain symmetry in Goffman's formulations of 'what comes first'. Whether 'men' or 'moments', a kindred sociology of 'causatives' is preserved, and neither quite chimes of EMCA's praxiologies. Sacks took interest densely produced local orders of interaction that have a good deal to do with the parties' identities and biographies as well as the moments that occasion their relevance (as in Portia's

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17 On their account, expecting answers or second greetings become 'impositions', reduced to a 'type-fitting response', or its absence. The characterizations are apparently lifted from Schegloff's remarks in their continuing passage:

> Specifically, 'given the first [utterance], the second is expectable; upon its occurrence it can be seen to be a second item to the first; upon its nonoccurrence it can be seen to be officially absent—all this provided by the occurrence of the first item' (Schegloff 1968, 1083). (Stivers and Rosanno 2010, 5)

'Expectable', yes, but rather than impositional moves, Sacks and Schegloff are speaking of organizations that afford multiple possible next turns, as we see in Sacks' early work with his Suicide Prevention materials having to do with how callers to the Center give their names, or not. Schegloff suggests that this was a first work in sequential analysis (Sacks 1992 v. 1, part 1, lecture 1, 3–11; Schegloff Introduction, v. 1, xvii). There is nothing so linear or determinative about conversation's sequential order as Stivers and Rossano suggest, though normative accounts of social order have long been associated with accountability relations.

account to Agnes of her trip). When we examine singular events as Sacks does (and see also his skepticism about their 'complete' analysis [1992 v. 2, 157]), we can understand the argument that Schegloff is making without rendering it a programmatic choice structure as Goffman and then Stivers and Rossano, in reverse, do.

b) Second, allied to the study of 'deployers', Schegloff finds in Stivers and Rossano a kindred disposition to treat social actions as de-composable organizations, or what he refers to as "deconstruction". The impulse is venerable: to render social scenes, settings, structures, actions and interactions—now 'practices'—as assemblages of lesser structures or modalities that are available for stand-alone examination as constitutive 'parts'. Thus, Stivers and Rossano take up the linguistics of morpho-syntactical turn designs, prosody, gaze and epistemic [a] symmetries, along with a general orientation to sequential position. These constituents not only promise answers to their question, but the question itself: 'so how can we disentangle whether it is the action alone or the combined presence of these features that mobilizes recipient response?' [9]. The paper delivers the solution to variable response mobilizations in this 'disentanglement' register. Said differently, just what is the distance between 'the action alone', on the one hand, and the 'combined presence of these features that mobilizes recipient response', on the other, and how has this distance been construed as an explanation of the 'fact' of variable response mobilization? The exercise of formulating constituent elements and their 'interactions' is emblematic of constructive analysis (see Button, Lynch and Sharrock 2023, chapter 10, especially). One can see its play in Mikesell et al., 2017 as well.

c) Lastly, Schegloff turns to the collection Stivers and Rossano have assembled, as it is the collection that delivers the putative gap in our understanding of variable next-turn responses. He points out that virtually every exhibit in the collection is an occasion of resuming from a "continuing state of incipient talk", where the talk has quieted for a while, and one party works to resume it.[18] It is from this lacuna in assembling their collection that the puzzle of 'response mobilization' is produced. 'Incipient talk' has of course its occasions. But here it has become evidence for the systematic 'mobilization' of next turns, leveraged from what the authors fail to notice about the cases that constitute their collection. The failure renders a formal structure of constituent parts (turn design, prosody, epistemic territories of knowledge, etc.), and the laic hearings whereby the parties are assessing on-going turns and their sequential environments are lost. 'Response mobilization' is an artifact of the collection's own making, and Schegloff offers an instructive corrective:

18 See Appendix B for an exhibit of 'incipient talk' from the turn–taking paper (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974, 714–715). Resuming from a spate of incipient talk can indeed show efforts to mobilize a response. (Note the two lapses of 16 and 14 seconds, and the next turns to them; note also the duration of the last line.) But this is hardly the engine for the sequential progressivity of conversations underway. See also Schegloff and Sacks (1973, 324–325) on talk 'among members of a household in their living room, employees who share an office, passengers together in an automobile, etc., that is, persons who could be said to be in a 'continuing state of incipient talk'.

> A corpus is for us, then, not an aggregate of data to be analyzed, but an aggregate of data that have been analyzed, each in its own terms, the convergence of which yields us our best formulation of the general and formal organization of practices that we put forward, (Schegloff 2010b, 134)

The Stivers and Rossano collection is not the only occasion in the CA corpus where collections have been assembled on behalf of novel claims and findings that invite the re-analyses of the cases that constitute them, as Schegloff has done. His (1987) re-analyses of West and Zimmerman's (1975) corpus is an early and instructive exemplar. See Schegloff (2007b, 2009) for more recent exercises, and more can be found in critiques of the EAF (see Lynch and Macbeth and their colleagues, 2016).[19]

In these re-analyses we also see an exercise that ties back to Sacks' 1984 "Notes on methodology" (edited by Jefferson substantially from his *Lectures*) where he clarifies the history of his enterprise.

> It was not for any large interest in language or from some theoretical formulation of what should be studied that I started with tape-recorded conversations, but simply because I could get my hands on it and I could study it again and again, and also, consequentially, because others could look at what I had studied and make of it what they could, if, for example, they wanted to disagree with me. (1984, 26)

Schegloff and others have been engaged in what Sacks anticipated: if we wish to disagree with an analysis we can return to the materials that underwrites it, and examine them again.

Clearly, every collection is assembled to serve an interest, as in the collection that organized the repair paper (Schegloff, Sacks and Jefferson 1977). Through the careful description of its constituent cases, it delivered, among other things, the insight of the 'repair space' of four positions. And of course re-analysis is more than nay-saying. It is rather saying that the materials in question have been mis-sighted and giving grounds for how else we might take interest in them, as in our last exhibit.

VIRGINIA[20]

The exhibits and their discussions have been on topic of how the play of constructive-analysis—such as actor-centric and deconstructive theorizing—is finding a place within contemporary CA. When we find them, they seem tied to problematic treatments of laic analyses and what is un-seen or ignored about them in the materials that assemble the collections that then warrant novel findings. We see in the two prior examples how 'gaps' in the description

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19 More recently still see Button, Lynch and Sharrock (2022, chapter 8) for re-analyses of the Heritage et al. analyses, following Goffman, of apologies and their 'virtual offenses' (Heritage and Raymond 2016; Heritage, C. Raymond and Drew 2019) in Button, Lynch and Sharrock (2022, chapter 8). Central to several of these critiques is the impulse to render vernacular expressions—indexical expressions in myriad everyday uses—as expressions now 'indexing' formal structure, e.g. 'Sorry'.

20 This sequence was examined in Macbeth (2022). Though the treatment has been amended, unavoidably text from the prior publication has been borrowed.

of laic productions are produced, how disciplinary analyses are then introduced to fill and bridge them, and how they in turn speak on behalf of what is going on. These are the 'fraught relations' of the title phrase.

We see something kindred but distinctive in the last exhibit. It is a single case within a modest collection assembled by Drew (2018b) in his contribution to the 2018 special issue of *Discourse Studies* rebutting a prior special issue (Lynch and Macbeth 2016).[21] As in those found in Mikesell, et al's framings and Stivers and Rossano's collection, it also annotates novel organizations that aren't, in their connective tissue, quite sequential.

In the particulars of the exhibit an identifying proposal of the EAF (Drew 2018a) is presented, wherein declarative turns evidence a K+ epistemic stance or status for its speaker, while negative-interrogatives are deferential: K– for the speaker, and K+ for the recipient (Heritage 2012).[22] And again, all collections begin from the analyses of the sequences that assemble them, and our third exhibit is one such, and is again instructive for how laic expressions can be rendered evidence of formal structures that have little or no attachment to those self-same laic productions.

Collected in the 1970s, the sequence is well-known in the CA corpus as one of several exchanges between an irrepressible teenager, Virginia, and her mother at the dinner table. (See Schegloff 2005, 2007a and Sidnell, 2010 for discussions of the materials and their setting.) Drew's chapter is framed with a first discussion of how the 'ubiquity' of knowledge claims and attributions in conversational interaction are:

> a. embedded in turns and sequences;
> b. inform turn design;
> c. are amended in the corrections that speakers sometimes make... and;
> d. are contested, in the occasional 'struggles' between participants, as to which of them has epistemic primacy. (Drew 2018b, abstract)

There is a striking image here of ubiquitous engines of conversation's order (items a and b) that are only sometimes evidenced at its surfaces in occasional amendments and contestations

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21 There were no further published rejoinders in the journal. But See Lymer, Lindwall and Ivarsson (2018), Lynch, (2018a) and Macbeth (2018) for replies to Heritage's (2016) on-line rebuttal that is no longer available.

22 Schegloff (1984) took a very different view of syntactical forms for understanding conversational action. His 'general point' may be the greater one:

> A ready bridge is apparently before us to cross from language to social behavior, in which, it might appear, the syntax will bear the load. Though it might be conceded that no complete or neat linguistic account of questions is yet available, the relevant attributes being variously apportioned among syntax, prosody, and other resources, still it might appear that linguistic resources will allow the construction and recognition of utterances as questions, and thus as actions of a certain type. Now I think such a view is, or would be, as misleading with regard to questions as a way of bridging language and social action as it is in the case of promises. The general point is that it is misleading to start to account for such categories of action as questions, promises, and so on as the analytic objects of interest. They are commonsense, not technical, categories and should be treated accordingly. (1984, 30)

(items c and d), as though when not in view, they were still in play.[23] While the premise—that we only occasionally witness order's engines—is well known in social science, EMCA has written a very different account of a witnessable order played out on the surfaces of things, *in vivo*.

EAF studies also rely on morpho-syntactic forms and their alternations for parsing epistemic gradients and endowments (Heritage 2012, *passim*). The play of a turn's contingent production along the gradient is understood when one or the other—the declarative or the negative-interrogative (or both, as is said in this case)—is produced. But it can be useful to consider the many forms an action may take, as in a question, complaint, or announcement. Such things are produced to be found as apt moves for assessing what they are doing and what they call for next, and these reckonings can turn on more than last turns taken.[24]

Drew's modest collection of 'epistemic amendments' aims to show the 'gradient' of turns that begin as K+ declaratives but are repaired to K– negative interrogatives, and how the repair *cedes* the 'primary epistemic status to the recipient'. Following a few prior exhibits of the alternation, he presents the exchange between Virginia and her mother at the dinner table about whether Virginia can work in sales at her mother's clothing store.

```
#10 Virginia 145
1 Mom:   Beh- oh:, Vuhginia, we've been through this. When you're
2        old enough you ca:n work in the store.
3        (0.2)
4 Vir: → ˙hh Well Beth didn' Beth get tih work b'fore she was sixteen?=
5 Mom:   =No::! I'd- (0.2) I would let her wrap presents an' packages et
6        Christmus an:'- °times we needed somebady.° ˙hh >But people
7        just don't want< (0.4) chi:ldren (0.2) waiting on[('um).
8 Vir:                                                  [I'm not a chi:::ld!
(Drew 2018b, 176)
```

A discussion follows with a reference to a prior exhibit:

> The self-correction in excerpt 10 is slightly more complex insofar as the switch to an interrogative from a declarative exploits a pivot on *didn'*; Virginia begins her turn in line 4 by seeming to declare that *Well Beth didn'* but then corrects that to go off in a different direction to ask, in a negative interrogative, *Didn' Beth get tih work* ... (176–77)

23 Note also how items [a] and [b] are conceptual—even 'declarative'—formulations, whereas items [c] and [d] are actionable; they can be seen and described.

24 See Sacks (1992 v. 2, 178) on a neighbor's analysis of how her neighbor, in announcing in passing that her husband had delivered the newspaper to their doorstep, is to be understood as announcing that her separated husband has returned home: 'Mac put your paper on the porch...' A declarative syntax won't account for what's being said and done here, nor is a gradient in evidence.

The account is the centerpiece of the analysis, and trades on a parsing of line 4 through Clayman and Raymond (2015) on "modular pivots", proceeding from Schegloff's (1979) treatment of 'pivots' in same-turn self-repairs—words or phrases that knit together both the initiation and the repair segments of the turn. Drew also says we have a self-correction here, but says no more as he moves on to a next sequence. Virginia's putative pivot from a declarative of '*Well Beth didn't*' to the negative interrogative of '*Didn' Beth get tih work...*' ends the discussion. But in this sequence, a self–repair does seem likely, and in a way that may have no need for a 'pivot' to describe its production. A self-repair seems more straight-forward when we consider the work it achieves, and the 'different direction' it opens.[25]

Throughout the EAF discussions, when 'declaratives' become 'negative interrogatives' it is said that the turn cedes 'epistemic primacy' to the recipient.[26] We don't quite find this discussion in Drew's treatment of the Virginia sequence, but I want to offer an alternate reading that may account for the sequence in a very different fashion.

It begins with how it is not clear that Virginia's turn-initial phrase of line 4 is Well *Beth didn'*... where 'didn't' claimedly is the pivot between the self-initiation of a repair (or correction) from a declarative to a negative-interrogative. The turn may also begin with *Well Beth*..., in which case the continuing turn does indeed show a self-repair to '*Didn Beth*...' (see footnote 25). And while it's quite clear that Virginia does indeed go on to produce something like a 'negative interrogative', we may be on more secure grounds to begin with how she asks her mother a question, about Beth, who is her older sister. And in background remarks on these materials Schegloff (2005, 458) tells us that Beth is videotaping the dinner for a college class under instructions to keep quiet while she does so. So Beth (and perhaps also their brother

25 The repair is on 'Well Beth...' and how she then re-starts with 'didn't Beth...' On hearing the audio tape there is a gentle acceleration of her pace and questioning intonation beginning with 'didn't', and a softened stress on her second 'Beth', something like this:

```
4 VIR: → ˙hh Well Beth > didn' Beth > get tih work > b'fore she was > sixteen?=
```

And while there may be other contexts in which 'Well Beth didn't' could be heard as a declarative, with no need for a 'pivot' to make the claim, her repair to the negative interrogative '[D]idn' Beth get tih work b'fore she was sixteen?' is hearably complete. And its work cedes nothing; it has to do with what *everyone* knows. See below.

26 In Drew's first sequence Hal receives a phone call from Leslie and a repair to a negative interrogative can be seen in line 3:

```
1. Hal:  Oh 'el[lo Lesl[ie?
2. Les:        [.hhhh  [I RANG you up- (.) ah: think it wz la:s' night.
3.       But you were- (.) u- were you ↑ou:t?
(Drew 2018b, 175)
```

But rather than talk of 'ceding primacy', it might be enough to say that sometimes we're alert to saying more than we know. There's no need to imagine a 'gradient' to know with certainty that we weren't there.

Wesley) is in the room too. And thus there are perhaps four parties who may know something of who has worked in the shop, how old she was, and who's old enough now.

So it is not simply that we have a "negative interrogative" here. Or, alternatively, it *is* simply a negative interrogative, fitted to the work of getting this question asked on this occasion, rather than indexing something else out of view. What we may have in Virginia's question is a 'question with a known answer', meaning a question whose answer could be well known by Virginia, by her mother—whose question it is—and by others in the room.

So perhaps Virginia's repair from 'Well Beth' to '... Didn't Beth' isn't a play on gradients, but a play on recipient design, both for her mother *and* Beth and for her mother *in* Beth's presence (Sacks et al. 1974, 727). And this can make answering delicate, as evidenced in her mother's exasperation. Further, by this reading we are relieved of the puzzle of her exasperation. If by a negative-interrogative Virginia has just ceded "epistemic primacy", it was not well received. But understood through their orientation to recipient design and questions with answers known to others, Virginia's repair-to-a-question both displays her laic analysis of the room, as it dissolves the puzzle of her mother's response.

And while Beth may be there on instructions to keep quiet, she's no mere 'third person reference'. I take it Virginia repairs her turn just as she sees the relevance of Beth's presence for it. The negative-interrogative delivers a question in the presence of knowing others, and Beth needn't say a word to make Virginia's repair transformative. It is enough that Beth witness the question—and others witness her witnessing—to make answering delicate for the person whose question it is. The repair reads into relevance 'what we *all* might know', rather than an invidious gradient. If anything, it reads K– status or stance out of relevance.

Virginia's repair also displays her analysis in a way that Sacks remarks on more than once: we see how *fast* it is, how her analyses of the relevance of the parties in the room shapes her speaking *as* she's speaking (see Sacks v. 2, part 2, lecture 3, 111). Sacks' observations on how quickly we can see temporal and organizational horizons in their immediacies show us how agile 'laic analyses' can be in the production of on-going turns and their formative grammars. This is not Goffmanian 'strategic interaction' (Goffman 1969) or 'face work' (1955). This is the work of laic analysts taking the measure of the temporal contextures and scenic features of 'how we're speaking now', who is there to hear it, and what might they do with it. The agility of Virginia's laic analysis is not so different than hearing an on-going turn's production to sight its possible completion, or the first hearing of a joke's punchline (Sacks 1974). They are all laic-analytic reckonings.

CONCLUSION

The Western cannon was largely written on behalf of formal orders 'out of view'. EMCA points to the locally achieved orderliness of a 'plenum' concretely in view (Garfinkel 1996). The EMCA alternate to received social science begins with the detail of laic affairs that are, in their singular occasions, brightly in view for cultural members, yet routinely seen but un-noticed by them and, to no surprise, their over-hearing analysts. At the same time, they—the

occasions—give public evidence of practical reckonings in assembling the local order of ordinary affairs.

The conceptual distance between laic and constructive analysis is central to Garfinkel's EM (1967, *passim*; see Lynch's Interview, this volume, for a clarifying discussion), to the notion of EM as an 'asymmetric alternate' to formal analysis (Garfinkel 1996; 2002; Garfinkel and Sacks 1970), to its 'indifference' to those 'policies and methods' (Garfinkel 2002, 170), and to the astonishing proposal that the parties are the first analysts on the scene. Evidences and demonstrations of laic analyses are found throughout EMCA's corpus studies.

On the other hand, the extraction of formal structure from common ground is a long-standing promise of modern disciplinary projects, and this paper addresses what seems to be a renewed interest in the promise from *within* the EMCA literature. Founded on the primacy of laic-analytic worlds of natural language productions of sociological things, we find in our modest collection professional analyses whose explanations and accounts return to formal elements of speech production like 'stated reasons' and linguistic and epistemic turn features to leverage their findings. In each, the analysis takes its leave of the parties' laic reckonings, and they are not alone in the contemporary literature (see Macbeth 2020 for other illustrations).

As we do, we revise by degrees the sociology of EMCA, as in its 'primary consideration of the demonstrable orientations and conduct of the participants in the interaction which we study' (Schegloff 2003/2017, 29; see also Schegloff 2009), the order-productive work of instructed actions (Garfinkel 2002; Lynch and Lindwall 2023), and the unrelieved play of natural language in assembling account-able worlds of common understanding (Moerman and Sacks 1988; Sacks 1992). This paper is trying to describe how the turn is made, and as Schegloff observed it may have to do with 'the situation of inquiry for the investigators' in their pursuit of mutually rewarding disciplinary alliances that require conceptual fusions to leverage them (2017, 29).

We can perfectly well understand the attractions, and few commentaries on the intersections of laic productions and constructive-analytic ambition cut as deeply as the studies by Michael Lynch. He has provided patient instruction in members' methods—lay and professional—in his science studies (Lynch 1985; and especially 1993, and including Sacks' 'primitive science' [1984] in Lynch and Bogen 1994), his forensic studies of the techtonic encounters of the legal and scientific estates in the 20th century (Lynch et al. 2008), studies of the reciprocal foundations of EM and CA (Lynch 2000a), the play of theory (Lynch 1999), constructivism (Lynch 1998), and criticism in the literature (Lynch 1995, 2019b), of 'practices' (Lynch 2001) and 'reflexivity' (Lynch 2000b) in EMCA and how they can be taken up elsewhere for the 'just so much' that is useful, and also how constructive analysis can be revived in nominal EMCA studies (Button, Lynch and Sharrock 2022; Lynch 2018a, 2020).

He has produced clarifying examinations of EMCA's various projects and initiatives, as in the alignments of Garfinkel and Sacks (Lynch 2019a; Button, Lynch, and Sharrock 2022), Garfinkel's reckonings of science (Garfinkel 2023) [and Schutz before him (Lynch 1988)], his clarifications of Garfinkel's 'judgmental dope' (1993, 2012), what use he—Garfinkel—had for Durkheim's aphorism (2009), his treatments of 'Instructed Action' (Lynch and Lindwall 2024), the enduring relevance of Sacks' (1984) 'primitive science' (Lynch 1993; Lynch and Bogen 1994), and how the dispositions of constructive analysis can be revived in the formal

constructions of nominal EMCA studies, as seen in our few exhibits and elsewhere (Button, Lynch and Sharrock 2022; Lynch 2019b, 2020; Lynch and Macbeth 2016).

There are of course many instructive EMCA scholars and texts; we are blessed with them inter-generationally, and they are among the contributors to this volume. And yet the subordination of laic analyses to the pursuit of constructive analyses is still with us, renewing the promises of analytic 'straight highways' and the comforts of synoptic fields of view.[27]

The distance between these projects is substantial, and my aim is to catch their encounters in these few exhibits. A return to the normative asymmetries of the professional and the laic, the powers of the former and the insufficiencies of the later, are clearly formative. We tend to find in these 'situations of inquiry' problems —and then solutions—of the inquiry's own making. But perhaps the central problem is to render EMCA's conceptual and analytic programs amenable to more familiar expectations of academic language study. Schegloff (2009, 2017) addresses these contingencies directly, and they may be the identifying challenge for EMCA as we move further into the space beyond its first generations.

One could also say we are encountering the challenges of CA's success; the search is on for what innovations can be tendered next. We have seen several in recent years. In a slightly different key, EM is also in play in the 'situation of inquiry' that Schegloff formulates, for the 'what else', beyond their description, could be found for EM's praxiological and grammatical studies of social action, order and structure and the achieved understandings that underwrite them. These were the lifeworks of Garfinkel, Sacks and others, and such landscapes do not come along often.

Practically, and from the beginning, these fraught relations always have to do with the claimed insufficiencies of studies of laic productions for delivering sociological news, and the impulse to go about patching and repairing the gaps that are said to follow—as though EMCA have not been newsworthy for more than 50 years. Schegloff's commentary on Stivers and Rossano offers a different narrative on the laic for CA, both technical and conceptual, through the enormously consequential play of collections and the first analyses that assemble them. For sequential studies, a discipline that turns on conceptual and descriptive acumen, it is difficult to imagine a more fateful exercise (see Macbeth 2022).

The tensions and competition between laic orders of natural language use and the promise of constructive accounts that would eclipse them are central to the conceptual history of EMCA. They organize its projects and those of its critics (e.g., Levinson 2005). Lynch and many others have persuasively made the case for the powers of natural language to illuminate our understandings of social action and the durable order it underwrites. Nonetheless, the competition is still with us. But now, sometimes at least, as in the scary movie whose title I can't remember, the phone calls are coming from inside the house. And we are also seeing something of the enormously consequential play of the construction of collections and the

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27 The image of 'straight highways' is Wittgenstein's:

> In the actual use of expressions, we make detours, we go by side-roads. We see the straight highway before us, but of course we cannot use it, because it is permanently closed (1958, ¶426).

Descriptions of worldly laic action routinely show us endless side-roads; Sacks' Lectures are awash with them.

analyses of the cases that assemble them. For a discipline that turns on conceptual and descriptive acumen, it is difficult to imagine a more consequential exercise.

The tensions and competition between laic orders of natural language use and the promise of constructive accounts that would eclipse them are central to the conceptual history of EMCA. They organize its projects and those of its critics (e.g., Levinson 2005). Lynch and many others have persuasively made the case for the powers of natural language to illuminate our understandings of social action and the durable order it underwrites. Nonetheless, the competition is still with us. But now, sometimes at least, as in the scary movie whose title I can't remember, the phone calls are coming from inside the house.[28] The 'situations of inquiry' for the analyst, as different from the 'situations of interaction for the participants', can be privileged things, institutionally endowed and resourced with promise. And not unlike the ordinary settings we study, they also can run just out of view and beyond our notice.

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28 Jefferson (1989) offered a very different filmic allusion to the challenges confronting EMCA, and her cautionary call was also coming from inside the house—or the spaceship, or the tent, as are Lynch's—but from a different room.

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APPENDIX A

Sacks (1992 v. 2, lecture 7, 269–270, 'What's going on in a lay sense...')

Agnes: Where'djuh have dinner:: with them.
Portia: 'hh Oh, we went down tuh, Ravina.
Agnes: Oh:::/::.
Portia: Et the El Grande, en this Frank thet ownsa place, course Carl's built all these placiz y'//know 'n God 'e knows everybo//dy.
Agnes: Mm::hm,
Agnes: Mm hm,
Portia: He- Oh:: God whatta guy, that guy is absolutely go(hh)rgeous 'hh en so last night, they were, feelin' pretty good//je know,
Agnes: Mm hm,
Portia: They had quite a few drinks et home en then when we went down there tuh eat they ad // quite a few drinks 'n this fella, Frank thet ownsa place, he goes tuh, downa Rancho Cordova, so we adda lot in co //mmon yih know,
Agnes: Mm-hm,
Agnes: Mm::hm,
Portia: 'hhhh So he w'z kinda feedin'm drinks en so finally (hh)he' hh his uh, wife thet died's name's Ellen (hh)yih(h)know'hh (h)en hheh 'hh so 'e sez "Well now Ellen? uh you jus' (hh)be quiet" en s(h)he s(h)iz Kate (h)yihknow en she's so funny 'hhh //she siz "Okay Ted, "hhh//hah ha:h!
Agnes: ┌ ( ),
Agnes: └ She- Oh did she,
Portia: 'hhh en Carl is a genn'lmun yihknow =
Agnes: ( )
Portia: oh he doesn't like anything like that =
Agnes: ┌ n::No.
Portia: └ course Kate, she- she watches 'er Ps 'n' Qs//you know,
Agnes: Mm hm,
(0.9)
Agnes: He's crazy about 'er,
(0.6)
Agnes: 'hh/ jhh
Portia: Oh:: God, en I told im, eh so when she wen't' the restroom I sez "Boy there goes a great gal" 'n 'e s'z "Boy I sure l:love 'er 'n I hope I c' n make 'er happy' ' so, when, 'hh we came home why he wen'tuh bed 'nen we went swimming again 'fore w'w(hh)en'tuh/ jbed-'hh
Agnes: Oh:: God, isn'at fu::/n?
Portia: Ahheh! Yeh. So, 'hh I told Kate 'e said 'at 'e sez y- "Oh yer a liar" I s'z "Well no:: at's he said the: : : they- he said that to me" he s'z "Well 'e never tells' me" en I sez " 'e said that-tuh//me"
Agnes: Mm hm,

APPENDIX B

Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, (1974, 714–715)

4.11. Talk can be continuous or discontinuous. It is continuous when, for a sequence of transition-relevance places, it continues (by another speaker, or by the same continu-ing) across a transition-relevance place, with a minimization of gap and overlap. Dis-continuities occur when, at some transition-relevance. place, a current speaker has stopped, no speaker starts (or continues), and the ensuing space of non-talk constitutes itself as more than a gap-not a gap, but a lapse:

J: Oh I could drive if you want me to.
C: Well no I'll drive (I don' m//in')
J: hhh
(1.0)
J: I meant to offah.
→ (16.0)
J: Those shoes look nice when you keep on putting stuff on 'em.
C: Yeah I 'ave to get another can cuz cuz it ran out. I mean it's a//lmost(h) ou(h)*t=
J: Oh:::ah*he hh heh=
C: =yeah well it cleans 'em and keeps // 'em clean.
J: Yeah right=
C: =I should get a brush too and you should getta brush 'n // you should-* fix your hiking boo//ts
J: Yeah suh::
J: my hiking boots
C: which you were gonna do this weekend.
J: Pooh, did I have time this wk- well::
C: Ahh c'mon =
J: =wh'n we get- (uh:: kay), I haven't even sat down to do any- y' know like 'hh today I'm gonna sit down 'n read while you're doing yur coat, (0.7) do yur- hood.
C: Yehhh=
J: =(ok) (2.0) I haven't not done anything the whole weekend.
C: (okay)
→ (14.0)
J: Dass a rilly nice swe:: der, (hh) 'at's my favorite sweater on you, it's the only one that looks right on you.
C: mm huh.
→ (90.0)

[C-J:2]