Navigating the walkways: Radical inquiries and mental maps

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Introduction

This paper provides consideration of "mental maps" as an analytic device, and the importation of foundational theorising in new disciplinary environments. "Mental maps" – as representations, mental imagery, even a shared "mental topography" – is a popular and readily available device with which to conceptualise how we orient to our world (Gould & White 1974). The deployment of "mental maps" is frequent and extends beyond psychology (Blaut et al. 2003; Lloyd 2000; Lobben 2004; Xirogiannis et al. 2004), as conceptualisations reliant upon mental representations and cognition theories encroach upon other disciplines. This does not mean that the psychologistic reductions involved in the importation of mental maps as interdisciplinary work are diluted: the cognitivism of mental maps is preserved in new interdisciplinary settings.

Mental maps, as "explanatory fictions" (Coulter 1979), provide cover for analysts searching for patterns that draw together a patchwork of "data" (e.g. Matei et al. 2001). What I suggest in this paper is that mental maps are themselves iterative of foundationalist approaches; that mental maps are inappropriate means to describe social organisational phenomena; that the appeal to mental maps adds unnecessary complexity to analyses; and that mental maps work to distance the reader of analyses from the phenomena that they purportedly describe.

Some of the orientation and "situated literacy" (Kawatoko 1994) issues of mental maps have been respecified in empirical contexts (Brown & Laurier 2005; Ikeya et al 2015; Kawatoko 1994; Laurier & Brown 2008). For this paper, consideration of "mental maps" has occasioned further consideration of mapping, in terms of direction giving and the provision of descriptions as "location formulations" (Schegloff 1972). This phe-

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nomenon[2] – the formulation of place – was observed in a review of audio-recordings and transcripts from a separate project (Carlin 2009).[3] A subsequent pass (Jefferson 1981) identified the recurrence of these phenomena within that data corpus.[4]

The data resources for this inquiry derive from a project in which participants told me, qua interviewer, about their experiences of the Manchester bombing. On June 15 1996, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) claimed responsibility for a lorry bomb that reshaped the Cross Street area of Manchester city centre. A series of telephone warnings alerted the emergency services and, as these were verified as genuine warnings rather than hoax calls, the search for the bomb and evacuation of the city centre began (Carlin 2016). 80000 people were successfully evacuated before the explosion at 11.16am. There were no fatalities but a large number of people suffered significant injuries, many of these caused by debris and flying glass. The size of the explosion – at over 3000lb, the largest terrorist explosion within a mainland UK city – caused extensive structural damage to the city centre. The cordoning of the bomb site in Manchester, following the explosion, and the subsequent lattice of walkways around the construction sites, effectively caused a re-drawing of the navigable routes within the city.

One year later, I interviewed people who, in various ways, had been affected by the explosion. I shall say more about the Manchester bombing project in the next section. For this paper, it was significant that in detailing changes – how the city had changed, how their lives had been changed – some of the participants elected to describe, through direction giving sequences, the adaptations they had been forced to make due to the new ecological surroundings. Some of these changes were related to bomb damage; other changes were related to the cordoning of affected areas, including temporary and replacement structures, and designated walkways.

It is important to note that this is not a categorial analysis, capturing a praxiology of locomotion (Lee & Watson 1993a), or in which location formulations provide inferentially available community profiles (Benson & Drew 1978). Interview accounts confer a different analytic edge to the analysis than if they had been naturally occurring data. The

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[2] Such phenomena may have been observable in the peripatetic interviews conducted elsewhere (Clark 2009; Emmet & Clark 2011) but were not available from the written reports of these fascinating projects.

[3] Out of curiosity, in the twentieth anniversary year of the explosion of the Manchester bomb (June 1996) I returned to the original recordings from a project concerned with peoples' experiences of the bomb (see below); this paper has been occasioned by a review of those data, not the data presented in published papers.

[4] As a methodological policy for this paper I elected not to extract (what I considered to be) a collection of "relevant instances" of such talk from the corpus of recordings. In rhetorical terms, this is a risk; I am denying this analysis the credibility that may be conferred by the provision of supporting examples. However, as I suggest later in the paper, there are important matters of *context* and of *relevance* that are pushed aside by the provision of examples – who decides what is relevant, and how? How does the presentation of examples determine context?

possible distortions of the interview environment, and transcript analyses, are considered in Section 3, and readers may decide the extent of such distortion from contextual details.

The paper is divided into five main sections. First, I set out the terms of a problem in sociological accounts, to which ethnomethodology is indifferent: the prioritisation of conceptual explication versus empirical demonstration. Next, I outline the Manchester bombing project in Section Two; and look at potential sources of cognitive residue in social organisational accounts of navigation and way-finding, in particular the work of Edwin Hutchins (1996). Section Two also explores how mental maps are constitutive of foundational theorising. In Section Three, I identify a phenomenon: the occasioning of place formulations within interview accounts. In this section I shall look at practical mapping – the directions and navigation[5] of new routes through the familiar city – and how members formulate place within interview settings. In Section Four, I examine a sample of accounts in which place formulations are constitutive of accounts of the Manchester bomb; and how these are contrastive with theoreticised versions of mental maps in the literature. The practical accomplishment of navigating the cordon constitutes a critique of mental mapping as an approach to social inquiry. In Section Five, returning to the connections between conceptual and empirical work, I suggest that ethnomethodology can realise the conceptual and empirical as mutually informing, mutually elaborating outcomes of its inquiries.

1. Conceptual and empirical priorities

Michael Lynch (1994) accepts Peter Winch's (1958) argument that sociologists may recuse themselves from engaging in conceptual analysis by claiming that their disciplinary priority *as sociologists* requires them to concentrate on empirical problems.[6] Winch provided an example: "the question of what constitutes social behaviour is a demand for an elucidation of the *concept* of social behaviour. In dealing with questions of this sort there should be no question of 'waiting to see' what empirical research will show us; it is a matter of tracing the implications of the concepts we use" (Winch 1958: 18; emphasis supplied). However, Lynch elaborates Winch's position by suggesting that conceptual analyses, in turn, are made stronger "by giving them a distinctive kind of empirical sociological treatment" (Lynch 1994: 139).

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[5] As a study policy I resist the limitations set on technical terms (Golledge 2004: 234) and do not restrict my use of the word "navigation" to map-reading and forward planning. In this paper, "navigation" is a member's matter, glossing the activities of walking along narrow temporary structures across an area within the city centre, and the build-up of pedestrian traffic that results from large numbers of people trying to access walkways, which impacts upon unproblematic pedestrian locomotion.

[6] Watson (2008: 200) suggests that some sociologists *should* have recused themselves before they embarked upon "boy scout versions" of philosophy.

In this paper I shall attempt to show that we can reappraise a distinction between conceptual and empirical work by consideration of members' accounts. The tension between philosophising about phenomena, and demonstrating the importance of these phenomena (through empirical studies), was apparent in early debates surrounding ethnomethodology (Hill & Crittenden 1968). One of the contentious features of the *Purdue Symposium* was the persistence with which panel members averred that disciplines such as sociology were unrelievedly reliant upon members' understandings of their world. Moreover, that members did not have to wait for sociology, or the professional associations of these disciplines, to tell them how to understand their world.[7] Subsequent to the *Purdue Symposium*, there have been interventions that have worked to challenge and reposition the conceptual/empirical debate (Coulter 1989; Francis 1994; Lynch 1993; Schegloff 1987; Wieder 1980; Wowk 1984).

The detail of members' accounts of how they understand the social organisational world, which problematise the need for theoretical complexities such as mental maps as explanatory devices, articulates the requirement for empirical demonstrations, in the form of analyses of video-recordings from natural pedestrian activities. Analyses of "retrievable data" (in the form of video-recordings and transcripts) "permits of a methodologically radical respecification of conventional social science's preoccupation with social order and, in particular, of the social scientific conception of the 'relation' of consciousness to that order" (Watson 1998: 208).[8] In regards to the theorisation of mental mapping, I am not trying to "write a better textbook", as ethnomethodology's program was clarified in an early exchange (Garfinkel, in Hill & Crittenden 1968: 29). I suggest that the radical nature of ethnomethodology inheres in its methodological policies, and in respecifying foundational research programs.

2. Foundationalism: cognition in the wilds of Manchester

The Manchester bombing project was realised as part of an Anglo-Belgian research accord.[9] The project was designed to cohere with the Larimer Street inquiries of Edward Rose, at the University of Colorado, Boulder. Rose was commissioned by the Denver Urban Renewal Authority to conduct research on Larimer Street, the "skid row" district of Denver, which was being considered as an area for redevelopment and possible

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[7] We could add the cognitive sciences, also, as professional concerns involved in such re-description.

[8] This is a problem exacerbated by conceptual instability and residual mentalism within the social sciences. Indeed, and this is key to this paper, foundational issues within sociology are characterised by "the problem of cognitivism" (Watson & Coulter 2008: 7).

[9] "Euphoria and Dysphoria in Everyday Life", partially funded by The British Council. The Principal Investigators and award holders were Rod Watson, Department of Sociology, University of Manchester; and Yves Winkin, Laboratoire d'Anthropologie de la Communication, University of Liège.

(re)gentrification. In 1965 Rose led a research team to explore, from the point of view of homeless men, the contingencies of living on skid row and its importance to the city (Carlin & Slack 2013). The issue of change *as a relevant matter for members* – the possible demolition of skid row, the explosion of a large bomb – provided a coherent organising principle between the studies.

Like Rose's project, the study was comprised of open-ended recorded interviews – both opportunistic and pre-arranged talks – that were conducted within a single calendar month. Moreover, it took place in preparation for the publication of the final report of the Larimer Street inquiries (Rose 1997) in the inaugural issue of a new journal, that was being established by David Francis and the late Stephen Hester. Given the auspices of the study, namely, ethnography in an ethnomethodological mode, it explored the social organisational properties of members' understandings of 'change'. This would be at variance with an "information processing model" (Coulter 1995); and for this paper, facilitating discussion at variance with a "mental information processing model" of pedestrian locomotion (Watson 1999).

In distancing analysis from a "mental information processing model" and pushing for a non-relativising, social organisational approach to members' practices, including navigation, it is notable that some ethnomethodologists cite, or have reacted positively to, the work of Edwin Hutchins (1983, 1996) (Brown & Laurier 2005; Garfinkel 2007; Goodwin 2000; Laurier & Brown 2008; Suchman 1987). Could impatience with cognitive science explanations have persuaded even one of its leading exponents to advocate that there were other aspects of the world available for description? According to Button (2008), however, Hutchins' discontent is not, as some commentators seem to have argued, with cognitive science explanations encroaching into the realm of 'the social'; or indeed that cognitive science explanations require supplementation with reference to 'the social'. Button suggests that this misunderstands the nature of Hutchins' arguments. For Button, Hutchins contends that cognitive science explanations do not go far enough:

> Hutchins' supposed critique of cognitive science is not proposing that the very idea of cognition is itself a mistake, the idea that is articulated in Suchman's arguments, and most forcefully promulgated by other critiques of cognitive science which, drawing from the work of Wittgenstein, explicitly argue the case for the social status of mind (cf. Coulter 1979; Williams 1999). Instead, Hutchins' position is that it is possible to provide a cognitive science treatment of the socio-cultural world; thus extending the remit of cognitive science to the socio-cultural world: 'Culture is a . . . process. It is a human cognitive process that takes place both inside and outside the minds of people' (Hutchins 1996: 354). Thus, the appeal to the socio-cultural world is not done to critique cognitive science; Hutchins is rather chiding cognitive scientists for having allowed the skull to define the boundaries of their discipline. Thus, in his book *Cognition in the Wild* (1996), Hutchins locates his examinations of the activities involved in piloting and navigating large vessels within Marr's (1982) cognitivist consideration of information-

> processing and Simon's (1981) representational description of problem-solving. Consequently, rather than bringing into a consideration of mind the social character of human thought in order to confront an inappropriate computational model of mind articulated by cognitive science, Hutchins wants to actually extend its provenance: 'I will move the boundaries of the cognitive unit of analysis out beyond the skin of the individual person . . .' (Hutchins 1996: xiv) (Button 2008: 88)

Of course, it should be remembered that while Garfinkel was extremely enthusiastic about various books, showering them with encomiums of praise – notably, but not exclusively, Talcott Parsons' *The Structure of Social Action* (Garfinkel 1988; 1991; 2002) – this was because he found perspicuous positions outlined within them, rather than indexing an acceptance of arguments therein. His high regard for *The Field of Consciousness* (Gurwitsch 1964) was, according to Liberman (2013), not unalloyed. Likewise, his attachment to *Cognition in the Wild* should not be misunderstood as an accommodation of cognitive-scientific positions. His oral presentation at the 2001 IIEMCA Conference in Manchester, later published as Garfinkel (2007), in which he "praxiologised" Hutchins' examples of navigation using Lewis' (1972) accounts of indigenous navigators in Polynesia, certainly was not a concession to cognitivism.

Part of the exception being taken here to mental mapping, as an example of mental representations, is the perpetuation of modes of analysis that are antithetical to the social organisational, visible world; and the *preservation* of modes of analysis that are inimical to praxiological explication. The persistence of particular discipline-specific problems in sociology – such as debate over objectivity and subjectivity, or structure and agency (Sharrock & Watson 1988) – yields purchase on the (Cartesian) foundations of sociology.

There is a danger, to which Button (2008) is alert, that practitioners of ethnomethodological studies are beguiled by *Cognition in the Wild*, and the programme of cognitivism. Ethnomethodologists may be interested in investigating topics which are also of interest to cognitive scientists, but their focus of interest differs:

> ethnomethodology empirically investigates practices, [which] differ qualitatively from any real or imagined cognitive domain. They are describable and analyzable, but not in a way that traces back to an internal, individual center of mental agency; instead, they are collaboratively organized, and bound up with distinctive instruments and objects (Lynch 2006: 102; my parentheses)

Whilst work on cognitivist projects, such as artificial intelligence (AI), may seem to have a recency accorded by Twentieth and Twenty First Century achievements, the psychologistic and metaphysical roots of these projects are apparent. In a remarkable analysis tracing the philosophical bases for and commonalities with Alan Turing's work, Stuart Shanker (1998) formulates how grammatical analysis realises, and clarifies, the *aegis* of current developments:

> the overriding issue here is the persistence of a Kantian picture which has been amplified by AI, even elaborated in ways that *prima facie* run contrary to some of Kant's most famous precepts, but remains Kantian none the less (Shanker 1998: 73)

I suggest that not only are the reductive commonalities traceable but they are also still operative. As mentioned above, the adoption of mental maps into a research programme does not connote that the practitioners of the new site for mental maps will imbue the concept with discipline-specific or field-specific profiles. In Sacksian (Sacks 1985) terms, the disciplinary setting may be transformed – mental maps may be applied to different fields – but the attendant psychologism of mental maps is preserved.

"Foundationalism" often refers to the assumptions and suppositions that form the ineluctable core of an academic discipline. Foundationalist auspices do not have to be identifiable through historical developments, as Shanker's (1998) work details; these can be discernible within more modern counterparts, such as traditional conversation analysis and ideological casts on the application of a conversation-analytic "programme" (Wowk 2007).[10]

This is important to highlight because cognitive residua are being re-introduced and reformulated in disciplinary settings. The terms of the foundationalism/anti-foundationalism debates (Francis & Sharrock 1993) were concerned with Cartesian modes of analysis; yet this neglects the incorporation of mental mapping, as a form of mental representations, which is based upon a mind-body dualism. Ethnomethodological inquiries treat foundational issues as accountable matters, as problems of investigation (Button 1991), which provides a methodological cast to theoretical problems. So, for example,

> There is … a policy of systematic transformation of the objects of inquiries into conversational matters. For CA the relevant question is not 'can we, the conversational analyst, provide a surefire way of telling this or that' but, invariably, 'is there a conversational way of telling this or that' (Sharrock & Anderson 1987: 306)

By treating epistemological matters as methodological troubles, treating analytic matters as members' troubles, ethnomethodology is afforded access to worldly materials free from distortions produced by foundationalist theorising.

3. Directions and mapping

> One could no more, I think, follow a rule of which one was unaware, than one could follow a route marked on a map which one has never seen. Of course, as I

[10] Though, in relation to conversation analysis, it is important to recognise that the notion of "foundationalism" is revised and respecified in Lynch (2000a, 2000b).

> travel from Oxford to Aberystwyth, it may happen that I take the route marked, unknown to me, on your map; but in doing so I do not follow your map, nor fail to do so (Warnock 1971: 48; quoted by Coulter 1979: 50).[11]

Warnock's famous example of rules – actions *involving* rules versus being *in accordance with* rules –is apposite to the provenance of our concerns: post hoc accounts of navigating around Manchester city centre following the bombing of June 15th, 1996.

Elsewhere it has been suggested that "Just as it would seem absurd to claim that a map in some strong sense controlled the traveler's movements through the world, it is wrong to imagine plans as controlling actions" (Suchman, 1987: 189). It is my argument that the cognitivist approach of "mental maps" is not sufficient as an explanation of human action. I prosecute this argument through interview accounts. Whilst the interview, as a research method, is not usually associated with ethnomethodology – the orientation towards interviews and interview accounts constitutes a *gestalt* switch with a standard orientation towards information elicitation (Watson & Weinberg 1982) – I suggest that versions of accounts supplied by *members themselves* work to demonstrate how ethnomethodology affords a distinctive 'take' on social organisational phenomena.

Members producing these interview accounts are reflecting the rule-governed constraints of the police cordon that was established not just around the fire-ground, but that went beyond the bomb-site in order to circumnavigate areas of compromised structural integrity. The police cordon was an active boundary, necessitated by safety concerns, which was progressively re-aligned through scaffolding, hoardings, and metal fencing to canalise pedestrian navigation along designated walkways around affected areas.

For an extended period of time, then, pedestrians' actions were restricted by explicit rules. First, by a legally enforceable police cordon that distanced pedestrians from the site of the bombing; then, by the de facto cordoning off from multiple construction sites; and the strategic positioning of designated walkways.

The end point of the re-building was a future prospect: residents knew that the reorganisation of the city centre had been imposed upon them, and that the restrictions would be temporary:

1. Frank:	Erm (.) even when you restore the walkways and that people have got used to walking the other ways ((laugh)) so they won't go the other way anyway ((laugh)) you know what I mean
2. AC:	Yeah, hmm
3. Frank:	((laugh)) it's a bit it's a bit like creatures of habit with it, you know, keep walking like ants down there, go left go right. And then you change it. And then when you put it back again they say sod that we're going that way now you know

[11] See also Coulter & Sharrock (2007: 182).

Whilst this discussion is located, originally, within members' accounts of the Manchester bomb, it is coherent with a large body of extant literature. "Navigation", or "Finding one's way around", has been a particularly productive source of inquiry for ethnomethodology. As an activity it has been used as a useful example to illustrate the ethnomethodological approach to social phenomena (Lynch 2013); it has been explicated as constitutive of other activities (Button & Sharrock 2013); how it is co-ordinated unproblematically with other activities (Relieu & Morel 2011); and as the activity itself (Ikeya 2003). A number of ethnomethodological studies have topicalised in situ activities constitutive of way-finding (Crabtree 2003; Laurier & Brown 2008) and the use of "occasioned maps" in the service of way-finding (Psathas 1979). One "learning outcome", to institutionalise these studies, is to reconsider the nature of cognition and cognitive activities in what are, inherently, social and collaborative productions.

This paper complements these studies of occasioned maps and way-finding.[12] The data-driven phenomena are of a slightly different order: rather than looking at members' use of physical maps – whether these are authorised, such as a map as a tourist guide (Laurier & Brown 2008); or ad hoc (Psathas 1979), or following instructions as proxies for using physical maps, such as hospital attendees (Sharrock & Anderson 1979) and library users (Crabtree 2003) – the phenomena of initial interest upon returning to the data corpus were parenthetical remarks within members' accounts.

To describe these as "parenthetical" is, of course, an analytically imposed re-description. However, "parenthetical" seems to be an adequate, if not sufficient, characterisation: these remarks, qua "side sequences" (Jefferson 1972), were not an interest for the project in which they were captured. However, on listening to and transcribing interview accounts, it was evident on the recordings that interviewees shifted the topic of their talk, temporarily, in order to provide the interviewer with locational information to inform and achieve mutual understanding.

"Parenthetical", as an analytic re-description, is not intended to distort or disambiguate "types" of talk. Parenthetical accounts were constitutive of the interviewee's accounts, they were seamless productions of ensuing talk. This embedded seamlessness is noted elsewhere: "Rather than saying 'they fit the topic,' or are 'appropriate to the topic,' it may be preferable to say that in their co-selection they, at least in part, 'constitute' the topic" (Schegloff 1972: 80). Moreover, such accounts were sometimes responses to requests for clarification by the interviewer: it is not the case that these were all unsolicited stretches of locational information. Nor is it the case that locational devices were uniformly detailed. Some interviewees provided sequences that, in the course of conversation, are not particularly notable; however, in the transcription of the conversation turn

[12] Wayfaring studies evidence how ethnomethodology is not a unitary approach. Instead, ethnomethodology "identifies a loose conglomerate of approaches sometimes bearing little more than vague family resemblances to one another" (Wilson & Zimmerman 1979/80: 52). Likewise, "formulating place" manifests a diverse range of approaches under the auspices of ethnomethodology (inter alia, Hester & Francis 2003; Ikeya 2003; Psathas 1979).

out to be fairly extended sequences of turns at talk. Yet at other times, the collaborative production of locational information was accomplished within a single turn, or sequence of turns:

1. T: Basically I just walked away. I just walked over the bridge away towards Salford.
2. AC: Blackfriars?
3. T: Yeah, just over the bridge there.

Indeed, we may treat some, but not all, of these stretches of talk under the rubric of "insertion sequences" (Schegloff 1972). To emphasise, however, this paper will not engage in reliance on Schegloff's explications of "location formulations", which were a core concern of his analysis (Schegloff 1972). This is, in part, owing to the evidential properties of the phenomena under discussion. To conceptualise the phenomenon of discussion as "formulating place" as being recipient designed, to follow an "economy rule" of person and place reference (Sacks & Schegloff 1979), is problematic.

The provision of location formulations, in the detail in which they sometimes occur, may very well be attributed to recipient design; but this is not unequivocal. Members, as interviewees, may be providing detailed or limited location information based on the presumed knowledge or ignorance of the interviewer, for instance. In the following extract, Frank – a manager at Victoria Railway Station in Manchester – is trying to explain to the interviewer where people had been evacuated following the discovery of a bomb:

1. Frank: There was several hundred people on ((inaudible)) there, adjacent Chethams. You know Chethams there, behind behind the – in front of the station there
2. AC: Yeah
3. Frank: if you go downstairs and go across, you'll see there's a grass bank, and it's just grass all the way round. Chethams's School of Music's just over there
4. AC: Right
5. Frank: An' there was about, I don't know (.) two, three, maybe four hundred people sat on the grass that had been moved back by the police as they'd moved people back. So I saw them out of the window, you can see from the signing-on point's kitchen window

In other words, the interviewee may be engaged in categorisation work, providing location information that assumes the interviewer is a local or a stranger (Psathas 1991). As such, recipient design does provide a candidate explanandum for location formulations. Nevertheless, it is not a necessary condition that members were doing categorisation, or were attentive to a presumed imbalance of knowledge with regard to the geography of the city centre. As interviewees, location information could be forthcoming be-

cause they were unsure how much detail was required, or would be of interest, to the interviewer.

Another reason to be circumspect about Schegloff's arguments concerns the provenance of data upon which his analysis is based:

"Although the warrant is considerably weaker, I propose to sketch some considerations relevant to the selection of formulations for another domain-locations. While in that domain also, and perhaps especially, the selection of a formulation or term must ultimately be analyzed in the context of co-selection of many terms, each from a collection of terms of which it is a member, I hope to derive some gains from some reflections on location-formulation selection divorced from conversational context. As I am proceeding here in explicit divorce from conversational context, I shall occasionally take a liberty not otherwise to be condoned of relying at various points on data easily enough recalled to have happened but not recorded and out of conversational context, or invented for the occasion" (Schegloff 1972: 80)

Whilst I am sanguine about his possible reasoning – conversation analysis was in its infancy, and had yet to develop its working policies for data analysis – his caveats on the examples used in that particular paper (Schegloff 1972) strike at the core of the conversation-analytic modus operandi. For example, the stricture on confining analyses to naturally occurring talk-in-interaction; which provides the practical logic for confining analyses of turns to the context of their occurrence. In a unique corpus of work on talk-in-interaction, Schegloff would move on to outline the analytic purview of conversation analysis, its epistemological position within the wider sociological firmament, and the parsimony of its methods. The methods and logic of conversation analysis had already been outlined in the raw (Sacks 1984a, 1984b; Schegloff 1968). I do not take issue with Schegloff for the form of his analysis which, at the time, was at an early stage of its iteration.

Nevertheless, the passage quoted above adumbrates issues within conversation analysis regarding context, which relate to the logic of transcription as a constitutive move in and as of data analysis, and that have yet to be addressed satisfactorily by conversation analytic practitioners: How does the analyst decide what constitutes context? On what basis has a particular stretch of talk been transcribed? Is the transcript excerpted from a longer transcript and, if so, why that excerpt? What was the reasoning for parsing the sequence of talk at those particular utterances? If utterances as constitutive of "surrounding talk" not only provide but are the context of adjacent utterances, what Roy Turner (1976: 244-245) called "double duty", why has a transcript commenced at a particular utterance and not commenced at another particular utterance?[13]

[13] These questions have not been addressed (despite Cook 1990); nor are they addressed, even partially, by multi-modal analyses, which reproduce the same problems.

4. Formulating place

There are a number of events which people can describe in vivid detail: whilst they may have had nothing to do with the events, the story that is told places them relative to the events. Harvey Sacks discussed conversational data relating to a number of these, such as the assassination of Martin Luther King and John F. Kennedy, and we can posit a much wider list: where I was when the Space Shuttle exploded, what I was doing at the time that the planes hit the Two Towers, etc. The Manchester bomb of June 15th 1996 had a similar quality for those residents of Manchester who participated in the project. Everybody had a story to tell.

The explosion provided for an organising structure to people's accounts. People were able to discuss, with certainty, what they were doing at the time of the explosion; to compare the city before and after the explosion, as in, how their personal and professional lives had been changed. A regular feature of talk was of the "At first I thought" characterisation (Jefferson 2004) – a hearable noise is explained away until the hearer accepts that it was a bomb explosion that had been heard. Frequently, this inhered within formulations of place, not just "What I was doing" but "Where I was at the time". The following is from an interview with Pete, a postgraduate student:

1. AC: what were you doing?
2. Pete: I can tell you exactly what I was doing. I was watching morning television. I was just watching TV and there was this huge bang and I thought "that's a bomb." The whole front of the house shook, literally shook.
3. AC: So where were you?
4. Pete: Rusholme
5. AC: Rusholme?
6. Pete: Yeah, as far away as that! The whole front of the house and the windows shook
7. AC: What did you do?
8. Pete: I flicked through the channels to see if there was a newsflash or something, but there wasn't one. I went up to wake up my mates, to tell them that I'd heard a bomb, but they didn't believe me and stayed in bed. I switched to CEEFAX and eventually it came up. That there had been a bomb in the city centre

Interview accounts described, in varying detail, how people living and working in Manchester city centre oriented towards particular locations within the city, and the trajectories of locomotion they employed. In response to a question, Frank – an operating manager at one of Manchester's main railway stations – elected to discuss how the buildings damaged by the bomb, and the unproblematic navigation of the city, had affected the routine activities of working at the station:

1. AC: Can I just ask then has the place changed for you?
2. Frank: Changed? Oh yeah it's changed. It's er, it's er I mean for a start er immediate change if you like is not being able to get your sandwiches like you used to do. Cos right across the road at erm (.) on the Exchange building
3. AC: Right
4. Frank: There was a little place called Bacon and Eggs. And I think all of our train crew and that we all got our sandwiches from there every morning like (.) breakfast and all and a bacon sandwich was from the Bacon and Eggs but of course it's gone, blew up, gone
5. AC: Hmm
6. Frank: Severely damaged. There's Wally's that used to be there that we used to have erm the engraving done for the first aid, er first aid trophies and things that we won competitions in. That's gone. Erm, I don't know (.) I think as many people are using the station as did before
7. AC: Ah
8. Frank: er, I don't think there's any change to that. But the surrounding landscape's changed a little bit
9. AC: Ah
10. Frank: Basically because of the amount of work that's taking place. I mean, what'll it be like when it's finished, I don't know, but at the end of (.) there's as many people using the place but it it's changed slightly, it there's there's there is a change, a definite change. Shops that we went to are no longer there. When you're walking besides the Cathedral and that now there's work being done on the Cathedral there's work being done on ah, on the buildings that are that are directly opposite, you've got walk you've got walkways, you're walking round scaffolding, and there's a there's a constant sound of construction taking place off the Arndale day and night
11. AC: Hmm
12. Frank: as a as they as work to to rectify the damage and that
13. AC: Hmm
14. Frank: So yeah, there's a there's a definite change, there's a definite (.) change to the layout of the station as well. I mean (.) you know it's just (.) but then again that was changing anyway, you know what I mean it was like the the city any city has a normal progression of change anyway new shops
15. AC: Hmm
16. Frank: old shops getting knocked down, new buildings going up

Walking through the city was a core feature of daily life. In the case of train drivers, for instance, walking through the city was not an activity in driving trains, of course. However, walking through the city was very much an immanent feature of their job. The

rail network in Manchester consists in a number of stations, including Victoria, Piccadilly, Deansgate and Oxford Road stations; drivers, as part of the work of driving trains, are required to connect with engines and rolling stock at different stations during their shifts. One of the operating managers at Victoria Railway Station in Manchester, who had been on duty on the day of the explosion, described to me how the cordon's facticity had impacted on drivers' work schedules:

1. Frank: The biggest thing of course is the amount of work being taken on the Arndale, and of course it did affect er, er, we had train crew that sign on at Victoria that have to walk to Manchester Piccadilly and that and at Oxford Road, and we have agreed walking times to these places, so we had to re agree the walking times to those places again because initially you couldn't get round the city. Where whereas you could they could walk out walk straight down Corporation Street
2. AC: Hmm
3. Frank: er, do a hang a left by the Town Hall and go down the Oxford
4. AC: Hmm
5. Frank: the Oxford Road they couldn't
6. AC: Hmm
7. Frank: because initially that was all shut off so men they had to go come out of the station, do a right, go down onto Deansgate and then walk the length of Deansgate.
8. AC: Right
9. Frank: And then up and into you know what I mean it it's
10. AC: It's a long way
11. Frank: It's a long way. Erm, or they had to walk up, turn, they could go up turn go up follow the tramlines up over over erm (.) to Lew the Lewis's building (.) and then and go down that way, towards Oxford Road. So it was ah the the the the walking time was increased. Erm, Piccadilly the walking time wasn't really (.) er, vastly increased, and it was it was initially because of the, the cordoning of the city because it was about (.) I think that all told it was about six days before they actually it had started to open the city up
12. AC: Right
13. Frank: to be able to go across. I mean they were (.) thinking back they were gathering evidence of the I mean if that that that van went everywhere. I mean there were bits of it on the roof here and all sorts. Er, so they they they kept it cordoned til they got all the bits of it like.

The analytic pay-off of immersion in people's own accounts of events and their environments is coherence with real-worldly orientations, rather than theoreticised versions of experience (e.g. Degen et al. 2010), or theoreticised versions of presentations of expe-

rience (e.g. Lavrence 2005). The psychologistic reductions involved in reference to *cognitive maps* (Blaut et al. 2003; Bomfim & Urrutia 2005; García-Mira & Real 2005; Lloyd 2000; Lobben 2004; Pinheiro 1998; Polic et al. 2005;) downgrade and ironicise the thoroughgoing membership work involved in trajectories of locomotion and navigation within public space. These are social, interactional accomplishments, which the mentalistic program of cognitive maps distorts; conceptualising membership work in terms of cognitive maps (Allen 1999; Kataoka 2005) "loses the phenomena" of locomotion, and of way-finding, in ordinary, familiar settings. Furthermore, the social organisational features of urban environments are traded upon, in unexplicated ways, by those corpora of studies concerned to display the re-branding and re-imaging of cities (Jansson 2003; Johansson 2012; Luque-Martínez et al. 2007; Richards & Wilson 2004; Waitt & Gibson 2009; Yeoh 2005).

Ethnographic studies of work demonstrate the value of people's accounts of work practices. There are "good organisational reasons" for mapping, as shown by the work of ordering, storing, moving, and retrieving construction materials warehoused in advance of need:

> The materials in question include pipe lengths of varying and non-standard sizes and shapes which need to be stored in a physical location. The amount of space available for the storage of these pipes is limited. The pipes are ordered from a subcontractor some 3 months in advance of need. Having said that, changes in construction schedules mean that pipes are often stored for longer than that. The locations at which pipes are stored are registered using a GPS system. Problems occur, however, when the warehouse team unexpectedly receives materials from the subcontractor which do not correspond to digital delivery slips. They have to be inspected against load manifests, recorded and then stored somewhere. Having said that and to compound the problem, the pipes that are delivered will not always correspond accurately with descriptions on the manifest. That is, they will often not be needed at that moment because work schedules have been changed. Thus, they need to be stored, often for months. The pipes are too big to be handled entirely by hand and a range of moving equipment is used. Moreover, because they are often of unusual shapes and sizes, they sometimes cannot be placed in spaces originally allocated for them. There is a limited amount of space on site for the storage of these pipes and, because they are often stored for months on end, there is a tendency for them to be moved around as workers search for pipes that are needed in the near future. Limited time means that the location of pipes is not always accurately recorded.
>
> In theory, pipe delivery to the construction site is organised three days before fitting specialists pick them up. At the same time, pipe fitters sometimes make unexpected demands because of changes to their work schedules. These sudden and unexpected requests mean that preparation is sometimes hurried and, more con-

> sequentially, that pipe fitters from the construction site collect pipes themselves (often displacing other pipes whilst they search for what they need, making it difficult for the warehouse group to control the location of inventory). Here, then, the practices of one group (pipe fitters, suppliers) have a significant effect on the efficiency of another (warehouse management) (Kashimura et al. 2015: 53)

The mapping of materials for prospective, anticipated tasks according to the schedules of work is not reducible to "cognitive mapping", though. The organisation of pipes by warehouse team members is a *social* job, a collaborative task that is responsive to pipe-fitters' anticipation of materials requirements for their upcoming work schedules. The organisation of pipes within the warehouse area is a "residue account" (Garfinkel 2002: 213) both of the work of preparation as a constitutive feature of construction; and of the ad hoc retrieval of pipes by pipefitters who are entering the warehouse store to meet the on-site contingencies of the work of pipe-fitting.

5. Radical ethnomethodology: accounting for 'the conceptual' and 'the empirical'

In this paper I have provided a preliminary take on the research proposal outlined by Michael Lynch (1994), one which, perhaps, formulates how ethnomethodological inquiries provide a significant edge to philosophical and sociological investigations. Ethnomethodological inquiries concretise philosophical and sociological concepts, and are thus recognisable as the reinforcement of conceptual *and* empirical approaches. Through the praxiologising of concepts, eschewal of established literatures as delimiters of topics, and renewal of methods according to the phenomena of investigation, ethnomethodological inquiries can avoid the legacies of formal analysis. That is, that the "reflexive ties" of conceptual and empirical analyses are realised in and through the work of respecification.

For example, the radical nature of ethnomethodology is manifest in its procedural or methodological policies, such as "ethnomethodological indifference". Ethnomethodological indifference enables the ethnomethodologist to engage in inquiries free from preconceptions imposed by accepted canons of literature on a particular topic, or dominant approaches to the study of a topic. This facilitates investigation of the "What More" that is available to the inquiry. One of the upshots of this policy is that "foundational assumptions" are held in abeyance; in this case, the cognitive paradigm and the organising concept of "cognitive" or "mental maps". In suspending analytic acceptance of mental maps, and witnessing the social production of route-finding, we are afforded an empirical, real-worldly basis for assessing conceptual positions.

Ethnomethodological studies of pedestrian locomotion, for instance, provide us with powerful demonstrations of suspending analytic engagement with pre-given concepts and foundationalist theorising. This "power" derives from the display of "tutorial phenomena" whereby members demonstrate to each other (and analysts), in situ, the concerted, collaborative accomplishment of walking along a street, or standing on an escala-

tor (Lee & Watson 1993a, 1993b; Watson 2005). For the purposes of this paper, what I am suggesting is that *the radical character of ethnomethodology is featured by empirical studies that afford "instructably observable" engagement with conceptual work*. Hence, considerations of mental maps are made perspicuous through the categorial-sequential, i.e. *praxiological* analysis of pedestrian locomotion (e.g. Relieu 1994; Watson 2005).

Within interview accounts we are witness to members' orientations to social organisational phenomena, such as walking around the city centre of Manchester. The social organisational bases of navigating the walkways, brought forth by members' talk, enables us to maintain that the conceptual work of "intervening 'mental representations'" is "wholly unnecessary" (Coulter & Parsons 1990: 258-259).[14] Moreover, we can see how regard for members' orientations to social organisational phenomena is not "news" to ethnomethodology: taking members' accounts seriously was articulated by panel members (Harold Garfinkel, Edward Rose, Harvey Sacks, David Sudnow) at the Purdue Symposium (Hill & Crittenden 1968).[15]

As empirical studies of social-organisational settings, the theoretical edifice of "mental representation", upon which further theorising (such as "mental mapping") relies, dissolves:

> If ethnomethodology succeeded in generating an empirical programme of sociological inquiry which placed the (reconstructed) sociology of knowledge at the heart of sociology, it may properly be thought of as a cognitive sociology. And yet the relationship between ethnomethodology and other forms of cognitive investigations cannot be thought of as simply a sociological appropriation of the subject-matter of cognitive psychology … [Ethnomethodology] makes possible a thoroughgoing sociological conception of the 'cognising subject' which is quite alien to most forms of psychological cognitivism (Coulter 1989: 16)

The "tutorial" aspect of pedestrian locomotion is also made perspicuous (for members and analysts) through the close observation of members' actions where those members are recognised to navigate the pavements and streets in ways which differ from normally sighted members. In praxiological advances on the pioneering and extremely valuable work of Bob Scott (1969), Louis Quéré and Marc Relieu (2001) go beyond re-

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[14] From this position, we see that *contra* the use of mental maps as explanatory devices (e.g. Tversky 1992) there is *absolutely no need* to approach members' phenomena as anything else than members' phenomena; and that there is *absolutely no warrant* to approach members' phenomena as (putative) evidence of the existence of mental representations, such as mental or cognitive maps.

[15] This shift in approach to members' matters provides the logic of ethnomethodological inquiries – "a sociologist has to take into consideration how persons in real life do their work in order that he, the sociologist, may do his work" (Rose, in Hill & Crittenden 1968: 22); and adumbrates phenomena of concern for such inquiries – "What procedures do people use to do going about knowing about the world?" (Sacks, in Hill & Crittenden 1968: 13).

garding blindness as a social role, whereby the behaviour of the blind pedestrian is (according to Scott 1969) socialised or "learned" behaviour. Quéré and Relieu (2001) move to show that practices of pedestrian locomotion are emergent from the in vivo "situational logic" of parties – both visually impaired and normally sighted – to public spaces. The complexities of adducing "intervening 'mental representations'", as Coulter and Parsons (ibid) describe the conceptual work of theorising cognition – in this case, mental maps – is simplified through praxeological, empirical work: the trajectories of wheelchair-users, visually impaired people, and normally sighted pedestrians, are *courses of action* (Quéré & Relieu 2001).

Empirical studies using "retrievable data" afford the analysis of what Garfinkel referred to as "wild" phenomena:

> Social structures, conceived as real-time accomplishments between actors, are contingent to emergent factors in a specific setting with just these actors and the observing analyst. One cannot speculate what the actors in a setting are collaboratively witnessing until the analyst, who is a competent member of the setting, sees it (Robillard 1999: 61)

For instance, that analyses of video-recordings of pedestrians reveal that normally sighted persons are engaged in constantly monitoring their and others' visual fields, trajectories, and minute "adjustments" to others' trajectories, thereby minimising the risk of collision between pedestrians (Relieu 1996); hence retrievable data surface and afford analysis of members' "intersubjectivity-in-social-interaction".[16] Empirical analyses, in an ethnomethodological mode, reveal the "*staggered quality*" (Coulter & Parsons 1990: 263; emphasis supplied) of members' (including analysts') orientations towards social-organisational phenomena.

Conclusion

Graham Button introduced a famous collection of studies of ethnomethodological respecification with these words:

> The vogue for fashionable ideas in sociology is fickle. Sociologists eagerly latch onto what appear to be new bodies of thought; they toy with them for awhile (organising symposium to discuss their significance for the discipline, giving over special editions of the discipline's journals to them, and proliferating texts that debate their merits), but then, often as not, sociology moves on. (Button 1991: 1)

Button's introduction struck a chord: the characterisation of mainstream sociology was particularly apposite, and he provides numerous examples of substantive fields in

[16] I owe this phrase to Rod Watson (personal communication 14 February 2017).

sociology that have flourished, only to fade once more into the background. What Button does not address in his introduction to his book – he leaves this to contributors to his collection,[17] and dissects in his own corpus of work – is the slippage between the concentration on social order as the organising principle for doing sociology, to the importation and reliance upon theories of cognition within sociology.

In a discussion of "mock-ups" – maps, instructional guides, and signage, for instance – Garfinkel adumbrated the program of respecification that would be articulated in subsequent publications (Garfinkel 1988, 1996, 2002). We may borrow his formulation on mock-ups to characterise foundationalist approaches such as cognitivism:

> …in the very way that it provides for an accurate presentation of features in the actual situation, and in the very way it provides for an accurate presentation of *some* relationships and *some* features in the observable situation, it also makes specifically and deliberately false provision for some of the *essential* features of that situation (Garfinkel & Sacks 1970: 363; emphasis supplied)

A phenomenon that was identified within individual interviews, and within the corpus of interviews per se, was the sequencing of place formulations, i.e. the concatenation of iterations of place descriptions, as a constitutive feature of the talk. This phenomenon was noticeable, ordinary, and recurred – it was not limited to individual interviewees. The unproblematic nature of this phenomenon is hidden by the complexity imposed upon it by the cognitive approach, and its literature on cognitive maps. Reviewing a corpus of talk in which participants made reference to pedestrian navigation within Manchester, and the enforced changes in route-finding following the bomb, demonstrated that what are adventitiously re-described as "mental maps" are not private, cognitive phenomena but are actually publicly displayed, accountable matters.

By resisting the accepted organising principle of mental mapping, the practices of navigating the cordon and the walkways that surrounded the de facto building sites were not reducible to "mentalisms and turned into features of the perceiver" (Garfinkel 2002: 129). Crucially, members' navigation of the designated walkways was observable-reportable – navigation is publicly available to observation, and publicly accountable through talk.

Directions, direction-giving sequences and formulations of place, for the in vivo purposes of addressing an interviewer, are publicly available. The recording of talk affords reproduction and inquiry of these activities. Thus, this paper has explored, in miniature, how suspending engagement with cognitive maps as the dominant mode of explanation for navigational phenomena provides a social organisational 'take' on pedestrian activities – even those circumscribed as "rule-following" activities, within the context of a safety critical environment, such as traversing designated walkways.

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[17] As editor, Button makes space for a chapter on cognition (Coulter 1991) but this does not exhaust the relevance and importance of other chapters within the collection to my arguments.

Ethnomethodology, then, provides a radical procedure that elaborates Lynch's (1994) proposal, identifying perspicuous instantiations of abstract, disquisitional matters which have been abrogated as "epistemological" matters. Taking members' accounts seriously affords real-world inquiry rather than forms of ex situ theorising, compressed by the requirements of foundationalist approaches that are enabled by the "explanatory fiction" of mental representations. In re-aligning methods with the settings of occasioned activities, empirical constraints provide for conceptualisation sensitive to members' practical sociological reasoning procedures.

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